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ABSTRACT
In the recent years, mobile applications (apps) have been immensely changing
the way of communication, socialization, work, and recreation through mobile devices.
Mobile app developers usually face challenges in product offering decisions. In the
dissertation, I study app developers’ product offering decisions when facing the setting
of multiple platforms, in-app purchase (IAP), and in-app advertisement (IADV).
Various analytical models are constructed in order to capture different conditions faced
by app developers. In the first essay, an analytical framework is developed to address a
product offering problem for an app developer that introduces paid or free apps in a twoplatform market. When offering a paid app, I find that the developer should launch the
product in the more profitable platform that has relative advantages in user base and
willingness to pay; whether the developer should launch the same app in a second
platform depends on the app launching cost. I find that launching free apps in both
platforms is a better choice as long as users are tolerant to advertisements in the app. If
users are not tolerant to advertisements, the developer should launch the app in the more
profitable platform. Furthermore, I find that if users’ disutility sensitivity to
advertisement is very small, it is better to introduce the free app rather than the paid app.
In the second essay, I consider mobile app developers’ product versioning decisions by
focusing on IAP. Should a developer provide consumers an app (free or paid) with IAP
option in one platform (e.g., Android or iOS), and how should it design and price the
basic app and IAP? I find that the answer to the former question is “it depends”, although
in most situations offering IAP is a better choice. I also compare forward-looking and
myopic strategies and show that the former always outperforms the latter. In the third

essay, I focus on app developers’ decision on the frequency of displaying ads to current
users; also, I examine app developers’ revenue model selection. From app developers’
perspective, I show that under information asymmetry condition it is possible to figure
out the optimal ad frequency. Furthermore, “trial and then free without ads” (TF)
strategy is always suboptimal. “Trial and then paid” (TP) strategy is dominant if market
size is small; otherwise, “trial and then free with ads” (TFA) strategy is dominant. The
welfare analysis suggests that any of the above three strategies can result in the highest
total welfare depending on market size and users’ attributes.
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PREFACE
This dissertation has been written to fulfill partial requirement of the degree of
doctorate degree in Business Administration (with specialization in Operations &
Supply Chain Management) at the University of Rhode Island. Manuscript format is in
use in this dissertation. The dissertation addresses a number of decision issues faced by
mobile app developers. Specifically, the first essay mainly considers the selection
decision of mobile app platforms (e.g., iOS and/or Android). The second essay attempts
to address the question of whether a developer should offer in-app purchase (IAP) on
top of a basic app (either paid or free version). The third essay focuses on revenue model
choice (either paid or free with ads after a trial period); it also considers decision issues
regarding app ranking effort and ad frequency faced by app developers. All three essays
target European Journal of Operational Research. At this moment, the first essay is being
prepared for the 2nd round review at European Journal of Operational Research, while
the second and the third essays are being prepared for submission.
The research topic of this dissertation originated from my work in Dr. Yuwen
Chen’s seminar namely Analytical Modeling in Spring 2014. In his seminar, I was
assigned to read, discuss and/or review some analytical modeling papers. The topics of
the papers mostly relate to new product development and digital economy, which are
Dr. Chen’s research expertise. Under Dr. Chen’s excellent guidance, my analytical
modeling skills got advanced; and, inspired by an article discussed in his seminar, I
came up with an interesting research idea. The refinement of this idea along with my
further pursuit has made it the first essay of my dissertation. The first essay was
undertaken approximately from Spring 2014 to Winter 2017. During this period, I also
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I hope you enjoy your reading.

Degan Yu
Rhode Island, July 25, 2017

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... ⅱ
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... iv
PREFACE ..................................................................................................................... vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................ viii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ ix
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................... x
MANUSCRIPT – I......................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 3
2.

Literature Review ................................................................................................ 5

3.

Model .................................................................................................................. 6

4. Analysis ..............................................................................................................11
5. Numerical Examples.......................................................................................... 22
6. Conclusion and Future Extension ...................................................................... 25
References ................................................................................................................ 28
Appendices ............................................................................................................... 31
MANUSCRIPT – II ..................................................................................................... 35
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 37
2.

Related Literature .............................................................................................. 39

3.

Model ................................................................................................................ 40

4.

Analysis ............................................................................................................. 44

5.

Numerical Analysis ........................................................................................... 53

6.

Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 56

References ................................................................................................................ 59
Appendices ............................................................................................................... 62
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 68
2. Relevant Literature ............................................................................................... 70
3. Model .................................................................................................................... 72
4. Analysis ................................................................................................................ 77
5. Numerical Examples............................................................................................. 83
6. Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................ 83
References ................................................................................................................ 86
Appendices ............................................................................................................... 88

viii

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE

PAGE

Table 1. Variable Notations ......................................................................................... 9
Table 2. Ad/Paid Version in Product Offering in Six Cases ..................................... 12
Table 3. Optimal Matrix for the Six Cases ................................................................ 13
Table 4. Combined Conditions of Concavity and Feasibility for the Six Cases ......... 14
Table 5. Optimal Matrix for the Bounded Paid Cases ................................................ 15
Table 6. Comparative Statics ……………………………………………………………………………….. 22
Table 7. Variable Notation ........................................................................................ 41
Table 8. Decision Variables in Each Case ................................................................. 45
Table 9. Optimal Solution Matrix for Unbounded Situation ...................................... 46
Table 10. Concavity and Feasibility Condition for Cases F, P, FI and PI .................. 47
Table 11. Optimal Solution Matrix for Bounded Situation ....................................... 47
Table 12. Feasibility Condition for Bounded Cases F, P, FI and PI ......................... 55
Table 13. Notations ..................................................................................................... 73
Table 14. Optimal Matrix for Each Strategy............................................................... 78

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE

PAGE

Figure 1. App Developer’s Decisions in Two Platforms. ............................................. 8
Figure 2. Threshold of App Users Disutility Sensitivity for Free App Offering Strategy
Dominance .................................................................................................................. 18
Figure 3. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Paid App Offering ........ 23
Figure 4. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Free App Offering ........ 24
Figure 5. Users' Willingness-to-Pay and Dominant Two-Platform Strategies ........... 25
Figure 6. Demand Modeling ....................................................................................... 42
Figure 7. Decision Tree for a Developer’s App Offering Strategy ............................. 46
Figure 8. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Free App Offering ........ 54
Figure 9. Dominance Relationship between Bounded Cases F & FI .......................... 56
Figure 10. Realized Demand in Both Periods ............................................................. 75
Figure 11. Dominance: TPA versus TP Strategy ........................................................ 83

x

Manuscripts
MANUSCRIPT – I
Currently being revised for the 2nd round review at European Journal of Operational
Research
Application Developers’ Product Offering Strategies in Multi-Platform Markets

Degan Yu, Yuwen Chen, John Ni
Yu and Chen are from College of Business Administration, University of Rhode Island,
Kingston, RI 02881, U.S.A. Ni is from Farmer School of Business, Miami University,
Oxford, OH 45056, U.S.A.

Corresponding Author:

Yuwen Chen, Ph.D.
College of Business Administration
University of Rhode Island
7 Lippitt Rd., Kingston, RI 02881, U.S.A.
Phone: +1-401-874-4406
Email address: yuwen@uri.edu

1

Abstract
Mobile Application (app) developers usually face challenges in product offering decisions. In
this research, I develop an analytical framework to address a product offering problem for an
app developer that introduces paid or free apps in a two-platform market. When offering a paid
app, I find that the developer should launch the product in the more profitable platform that has
relative advantages in user base and willingness to pay; whether the developer should launch
the same app in a second platform depends on the app launching cost. I find that launching free
apps in both platforms is a better choice as long as users are tolerant to advertisements in the
app. If users are not tolerant to advertisements, the developer should launch the app in the more
profitable platform. Furthermore, I find that if users’ disutility sensitivity to advertisement is
very small, it is better to introduce the free app rather than the paid app. The results from paid
app analysis also apply to the computer software industry.

Keywords: Software/Application, Mobile App Platforms, Consumer Utility, Product Offering,
App Developer.
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1.

Introduction
Since the launch of Apple’s first iPhone in 2007, the touch-screen technology and larger

screen size have transformed smartphones into pocket computers that can execute complex
processing operations (including banking, photography, filmmaking, and gaming). The
subsequent growth of the smartphone market stems not only from better hardware components
and operating systems but also from the proliferation of mobile apps. In 2016, the numbers of
apps (or application programs) available on Android and iOS reached 2.2 million and 2 million,
respectively (Statista, 2016). The market value of the global mobile application (app) industry
was estimated at US$ 19.7 billion in 2014 and is expected to triple by 2020 (Transparency
Market Research, 2015). As the number of mobile apps grows, the app industry attracts an
increasing number of traditional software developers to join its market. By 2014, about half of
the computer software developers worldwide (around 8.7 million in number) had entered the
mobile app industry (Evans Data Corporation, 2014). Currently, there are several platforms in
the mobile phone industry: Android, iOS, Windows, and Blackberry, among others. The first
two platforms have a combined market share of 97%, and most new apps are often launched in
Android and/or iOS first (International Data Corporation, 2015).
Apps including mobile apps, computer software, and web applications (e.g., games on
Facebook, Twitter or MSN) are designed to run on specific devices and written for specific
platforms or operating systems. Users can download apps through app stores (mostly online)
either for free or at a price. App sales and advertisements have become major revenue sources
for app developers. While users pay for most computer apps and some mobile apps, few apps
are truly advertisement-free. In the mobile app market, most free apps come with intrusive popup advertisements. In mobile app markets, users also have different disutility sensitivities in
response to advertisement and app price. Chambers, Kouvelis, & Semple’s (2006) report
suggests that users of free apps are normally less sensitive to the annoyance from advertisements.
Revenues from app sales and advertisements are not the only factors app developers should
focus on. The sizes of the user bases vary in different platforms, and the developer must evaluate
whether it is profitable to develop an app for a specific platform. For instance, the market share
of Android is six times that of iOS (International Data Corporation, 2015), and Windows’ market
share is 14 times as large as Mac’s (Net Application, 2015). In addition, the willingness to pay
(WTP) also varies across platforms. It was reported that iOS users are willing to spend about
twice as much for apps as Android users (Evans, 2014). As a result, decisions concerning
product offering in multiple platforms are challenging to and pivotal for app developers’ success
(e.g., Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Lee and Raghu, 2014).
3

Previous research suggests that product offerings for information goods differ from those
for tangible products due to cost complementarity: information goods have a substantial setup
cost and very low marginal cost (Weber, 2008). A number of studies have examined the
information product offering strategy by focusing on factors such as product versioning (Weber,
2008) and pricing (Bala and Carr, 2009). However, the existing research focuses only on a single
platform, failing to address developers’ product offering decisions when facing multiple
platforms, which is prevalent in the app/software industry.
Moreover, platforms connect two groups of market participants (i.e., end users and
developers) and are thus considered as two-sided markets. Over the last decade, research on
two-sided markets has evolved alongside the rapid development of the Internet economy.
Analytical frameworks developed for two-sided markets have studied topics such as pricing and
commitment (e.g., Hagiu, 2006; Weber, 2008), versioning (e.g., Dogan, Mokerjee, &
Radhakrishnam, 2011; Bhargava, Kim, & Sun, 2013), and platform competition (e.g., Rochet
and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). Yet, most prior studies
focused only on the business strategies from platform firms’ perspectives, and there is scant
analytical research from developers’ perspectives. In other words, developers’ product offering
decisions when facing multiple platforms remained unexplored. An individual platform’s user
base is not the only factor determining whether developers should enter that platform. The
difficulty of app development in a specific platform, users’ WTP, and developers’ current skill
sets also influence developers’ product offering decisions (Pappas, 2013). In this paper, I explore
developers’ decisions on app offering, including platform selection, pricing and product quality
choice while considering app development difficulty, available prior quality, app launching cost,
market size, and users’ WTP.
This study addresses product offering strategy from the perspective of an app developer
that faces two app platforms. As my model incorporates different user bases and different WTPs
in two platforms, I focus on the app developer’s platform selection, pricing and product quality
decisions, assuming that the developer has predetermined whether to offer a paid or free app to
achieve a parsimonious model. Specifically, I address the following research questions: (1)
What platform(s) should a developer launch its app product in when the revenue comes from
app sales (or advertisement)?, (2) What product quality level should the developer pursue?, (3)
How do user bases, users’ WTP, and other factors determine the developer’s optimal platform
selection, pricing and quality decisions?, and (4) What are the optimal conditions for different
strategies?
This article makes several contributions to existing literature. First, it enriches product
4

offering literature by investigating two-sided markets from developers’ perspectives in a multiplatform scenario. I provide optimal conditions and platform decisions for each strategy (in
single and two platforms) by offering either a paid or a free app. The app developer should
always enter the more profitable platform; entering the less profitable platform depends on the
app launching cost. Second, I identify platforms’ WTPs and consumer densities as key factors
that determine platform entry strategy for paid app offering, and user’s disutility sensitivity to
advertisement as an extra factor to consider surrounding free apps. Third, I provide sensitivity
analysis regarding other factors that impact quality and pricing decisions. The platform that has
the higher WTP should always price the app higher if the developer decides to launch the
product. Due to different user densities in different platforms, a platform with a higher app price
may derive either a higher or lower realized demand. Furthermore, our findings from paid app
analysis can be extended to the computer software industry.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature relevant
to our research. Section 3 presents our model, followed by an analysis of the model and
summary of our major findings in Section 4. A numerical analysis is conducted in Section 5.
The article closes with a summary of the conclusions, academic and managerial implications,
model limitations, and directions for future research.
2.

Literature Review
There are several streams of literature related to this research, including research on two-

sided markets, multi-platform contexts, and product offering strategy.
Starting with Katz and Shapiro’s (1985) early study on network effects, researchers on
two-sided markets have considered problems where increasing the number of participants from
one group leads to higher obtainable utility for participants from another group. As research on
this topic has expanded over the last two decades, most studies have focused on business
strategies from the perspective of the platform companies (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003;
Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann, Parker, & Vanalstyne, 2011, Bhargava et al., 2013); analytical
research from developers’ perspective is still lacking. In an exception, Belleflamme and Peitz
(2010) created analytical models to capture seller investment incentives in platform competition.
However, their study assumed that the sellers have already chosen the platform. In contrast, my
paper focuses on developers’ strategies on platform selection and product offering. A recent
study by Avinadav, Chernononog, & Perlman (2015) considers a competition game among app
developers on one platform (retailer); in a Stackelberg game a developer with certain risk
preferences decides both price and quality level for its app product. Different from the model of
5

Avinadav et al. (2015), my paper addresses platform selection as well as revenue from both app
sales and advertisements.
Several recent studies investigated developers’ decisions in a multi-platform context. For
instance, Ku and Cho (2011) performed an empirical study of 245 ERP software developers on
the determinants of complementors’ platform selections. Jonnalageddaa and Saranga (2017)
examined commonality decisions in manufactured product design for multiple markets.
Bresnahan, Orsini, & Yin (2015) empirically estimated user preferences and developer’s
profitability. The results I got echo Bresnahan et al.’s (2015) finding that the most popular
mobile apps tend to be offered in multiple platforms. Departing from Bresnahan et al.’s (2015)
study, my analytical model focuses on app developers’ platform selections and product offering
decisions in a two-platform setting.
Another related stream of literature explores multiple product offering. Moorthy and Png
(1992) suggested that it is optimal for a firm to sequentially offer products in high-end and then
low-end markets if substitution and/or cannibalization effects exist. Desai (2001) analyzed the
cannibalization effect in product line design under monopoly and two-competitor settings.
Cattani and Heese (2009) investigated the offering strategy of two complementary products
when competition between two firms that focus on different markets exists. Chen, Carrillo,
Vakharia, & Sin (2010) explored product offering strategy for multifunctional products. For
information goods whose marginal cost is negligible, the product offering is slightly different
from that for tangible products. Weber (2008) adopted a locational approach to product
differentiation and created a two-period model for vertically and/or horizontally versioning
information products in a single-market setting. In the current paper, I apply circular markets
(Weber, 2008) to model consumers in different platforms and utilize a similar cost function in
Desai (2001) as product development cost. My research also offers one app product in multiple
platforms that can be seen as a product offering decision in different horizontal market segments.
3.

Model
In this section, I first introduce several assumptions regarding two app platforms and

users’ utility functions, and then develop the app developers’ profit function for the subsequent
analysis.
I assume that there are two platforms in a software/app market and each platform has its
separate user base. An app developer offers software/applications in one or two platforms. Sales
of paid apps and/or advertisements from free apps are the primary sources of revenue for the
developer. Further, I assume that an app product is valued by consumers in terms of its aggregate
6

quality attributes or characteristics (Rosen, 1974). To simplify, I assume that the developer
offers the app with the same quality (𝑞) across the two platforms. Additionally, I assume that
consumers are heterogeneous in terms of value preference and uniformly distributed within each
platform. It has been proven that the uniform distribution assumption does not change the
qualitative directions of analytical results (Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2002).
To capture characteristics of the app industry, I extend Desai’s (2001) model and Weber’s
(2008) circular city model to a two-platform setting (Platform 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2). To accommodate
the fact that platforms may have differently sized user bases, I assume that both platforms have
users representing the same market size (which is 2) but with different densities (Platform 1’s
density is 1 and Platform 2’s density is 𝑟 > 1). In Fig. 1, I expand the circular market with size
of 2 to a two-dimensional plane. Two end points on both sides of point 0 are one unit distant
from point 0. These two end points are identical when we draw the market in a circular market.
The thickness of the horizontal base line represents the user density. I normalize the first
platform’s density to 1 and allow the second platform with a different density (𝑟). This setup
allows the maximal distance disutility in both platforms to remain the same, regardless of the
size of user bases in the respective platforms. The total number of users is the product of market
size and user density (2 and 2𝑟 for Platforms 1 and 2, respectively). I assume that a consumer’s
valuation for an app product is 𝜃𝑖 𝑞 , where 𝑞 is the product quality determined by the
developer and 𝜃𝑖 represents the consumers’ valuation for the product at Platform 𝑖 (See Table
1 for notations). The quality is an aggregate measure of a bundle of attributes that typically
relate to the product’s performance and functionality (Desai, 2001; Weber, 2008). For instance,
the quality of the Google Maps app can be determined by attributes including user-friendliness,
data accuracy, speed of location search and positioning, and algorithm success of route planning.
I also assume that a quality upper bound, 𝑞̂, which is constrained by either the developer’s
capability or external factors such as technology limits (Chambers et al., 2006). For example,
an alarm is a simple app that represents an upper limit regarding how many features it can
contain under the current state of technology.

7

Fig. 1. App Developer’s Decisions in Two Platforms. An app developer faces two platforms
(Platforms 1 and 2) with market spread in two-dimension (The cylinder on the right of platform
1 is shown when users are spread in circular market form). Two platforms may have different
WTPs (𝜃𝑖 ) and user densities (1 in Platform 1 and 𝑟 in Platform 2, shown in the thickness of
horizontal lines). If the developer launches a paid app, the price (𝑝𝑖 ), quality (𝑞) decisions, and
distance disutility (𝑘) determine the realized demand (𝑚𝑖 ). If it is a free app, then both 𝑝1 and
𝑝2 are replaced by 𝑡𝑠 (not shown in the figure).
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Table 1. Variable Notations
Parameters
𝜃𝑖

User’s willingness-to-pay in platform 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2

s

Unit revenue for in-app advertisement in each platform

𝑘

User’s distance disutility parameter

𝛽

Development difficulty parameter of product

𝑞0

Prior quality level that the developer can reuse

𝑞̂

Upper limit of quality level 𝑞

𝑡

App users’ disutility sensitivity parameter for free apps, 0 < 𝑡 < 1

𝑏

Developer’s launching cost parameter for an app in each platform, 𝑏 >
0
Decision Variables

𝑝𝑖

App product’s price in platform 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2

𝑞

App product’s quality
Other Variables

𝑢𝑖

User’s utility in platform 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2

𝑥𝑖

Product's distance from the consumer's ideal point in platform 𝑖, 𝑖 =
1,2

𝑚𝑖
1 or 𝑟
𝑧𝑖

Realized demand in platform 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2
User densities in Platforms 1 and 2 are 1 and 𝑟, respectively
𝑧𝑖 = 1 if the developer launches the app in Platform 𝑖; otherwise, 𝑧𝑖 =
0

To determine the demand of the app product offered by the developer, I first evaluate
individual users’ utility. I adopt a linear demand function in our model. A user’s utility is
determined by the user’s valuation for product quality, product price, and transportation
disutility. The product price is a decision variable for the developer, while the user’s
transportation disutility depends on the unit transportation disutility (parameter 𝑘) as well as
the distance between the product’s position and the user’s location. Without losing generality, I
assume that the app product is positioned at point 0 on both platforms. Thus, a consumer in
Platform 𝑖 who is 𝑥𝑖 distance away from the app product’s position (point 0) has a net utility
of 𝑢𝑖 = 𝜃𝑖 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑘𝑥𝑖 . As illustrated in Fig. 1, given a determined price 𝑝𝑖 of the app product,
the longer 𝑥𝑖 is, the lower 𝑢𝑖 one can derive. Consumers would not buy an app product if the
9

net utility is not positive. This non-negative net utility is the participation constraint. Hence, the
farthest consumers that the developer can capture are the users who derive zero net utility on
both sides of point 0. Take Platform 1 in Fig. 1 as an example, where the locations of the farthest
consumers at price 𝑝𝑖 are 𝑥1𝑅 and 𝑥1𝐿 in the right and left sides of point 0, respectively. The
line segments on both sides are 𝑥𝑖𝑅 = 𝑥𝑖𝐿 = 𝑥𝑖 =

𝜃𝑖 𝑞−𝑝𝑖
.
𝑘

Therefore, for the app developer, the

realized demand in Platforms 1 (2) can be expressed as 𝑚1 =

2(𝜃1 𝑞−𝑝1 )
𝑘

(𝑚2 =

2𝑟(𝜃2 𝑞−𝑝2 )
).
𝑘

In other cases, the app products can be offered free to users. While developers can gain
revenues from in-app advertisements in these free apps, users might be annoyed by these
advertisements. A recent study by Ghose and Han (2014) has shown that free app products with
in-app ad options could reduce potential market demand. I assume that a developer is able to
generate the same ad revenue per user (denoted by 𝑠) in both platforms. App users, however,
are less sensitive to the unit ad revenue (in free apps) than the change of app price (in paid apps).
The reason is that free app users do not need to pay out of their pockets for the service.
Henceforth, I use Chambers et al.’s (2006) model structure for users’ price sensitivity and
assume that the user disutility for in-app advertisement is 𝑡𝑠, where 0 < 𝑡 < 1. Similar to the
price in the paid version, the more ads in the app, the higher level of disutility the users will
experience. Note that 𝑠 is exogenously determined by the market conditions and is not a
decision variable for an app developer. Therefore, the realized demand in platforms 1 and 2
when offering free app are 𝑚1 =

2(𝜃1 𝑞−𝑡𝑠)
𝑘

and 𝑚2 =

2𝑟(𝜃2 𝑞−𝑡𝑠)
,
𝑘

respectively.

To model the developer’s app development cost structure, I extend Desai’s (2001) model
structure by including a parameter of prior quality level from other similar past products so that
the firm can reuse the previous codes and thus save the development cost (denoted by 𝑞0 ). For
example, to develop apps for iOS or Android, a developer needs to be proficient in Java and/or
Objective-C programming languages (Hamlyn, 2014), which can be considered the prior quality
level possessed by the developer from previous projects. Similarly, the developer can reuse
some app components that have been developed in previously launched apps. The reuse of prior
quality levels is ubiquitous in the information goods industry and a topic of prior research (e.g.,
Bollinger and Pfleeger, 1990; Lim, 1994; Favaro, Favaro, & Favaro, 1998). I model the
developer’s development cost for the app product as 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 , where the positive constant
𝛽 represents the app development difficulty parameter and is inherent to the developer’s
capability. I also assume that launching an app in one platform costs the developer 𝑏𝑞 (𝑏 ≥ 0);
hence, if the developer launches an app in two platforms, it will incur 2𝑏𝑞 development costs.
I am aware that it is possible to write codes for one app that can be translated into both iOS and
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Android platforms; however, that type of coding works only for simple apps. For complex apps,
coding in the specific language of each platform is necessary (Stack Overflow, 2013). Our cost
structure can accommodate for complex apps (large 𝑏) with separate programs as well as for
simple apps with one program (𝑏 is close to zero).
Note that I assume the developer launches either free or paid app on any platform it
chooses to enter1. Based on the above discussion, the profit objective functions for the developer
to launch free and paid apps are shown as below (𝑧𝑖 = 1 indicates the developer launches app
in Platform 𝑖; and 0 otherwise):
max

𝑞,𝑧1 ,𝑧2 ,𝑝1, 𝑝2

2𝑧1 𝑝1 (𝜃1 𝑞−𝑝1 )
𝑘

+

2𝑧2 𝑝2 𝑟(𝜃2 𝑞−𝑝2 )
𝑘

− 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝑏𝑞 ∑2𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖

(paid app) (1)

where 𝑧𝑖 = {0,1} and 𝑝𝑖 > 0 for 𝑖 = 1,2, and 𝑞0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞̂;
max

𝑞,𝑧1 ,𝑧2

2𝑧1 𝑠(𝜃1 𝑞−𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

+

2𝑧2 𝑠𝑟(𝜃2 𝑞−𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

− 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝑏𝑞 ∑2𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖

(free app) (2)

where 𝑧𝑖 = {0,1} for 𝑖 = 1,2, and 𝑞0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞̂.

In the above profit functions, the first two components (e.g.,
2𝑧2 𝑝2 𝑟(𝜃2 𝑞−𝑝2 )
𝑘

2𝑧1 𝑝1 (𝜃1 𝑞−𝑝1 )
𝑘

and

) are revenues gained by the developer; components 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 and

𝑏𝑞 ∑2𝑖=1 𝑧𝑖 represent app development cost and launching cost, respectively. Since 𝑧1 + 𝑧2 ≥ 1,
if the developer decides to launch an app, there are six cases for paid app and free app strategies
(See Table 2).

4.

Analysis
In this section I present our approach to solving the model and discuss the overall result;

I then discuss cases for paid and free strategies separately; and finally, I compare the results
from the two app strategies.
The objective functions above are quadratic with respect to product quality (𝑞) and/or
price (𝑝𝑖 ). Since the developer has determined to launch either a paid or free version of its app
product, the decisions for the developer are twofold: whether the developer should provide an

I am aware that some app developers offer paid and free apps simultaneously; some even offer in-app
purchase functionalities in free apps. Several papers have discussed software and app versioning issues
for developers (Krishnan and Gupta, 2001). However, those papers only focus on one platform setting
with an assumption that consumers have identical marginal disutility for different versions of a product.
My paper focuses on developers’ decisions facing multiple platforms. As my model is already very
complex, I do not include product versioning in our model. Additionally, I also do not consider in-app
purchases in our model since in-app purchases are subject to users’ downloading first.
1
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app in one or two platforms, and what quality and price(s) (if paid version) should be set for the
app. Based on the combination of different scenarios, we have six cases for analysis (see Table
2). Since ad revenue per user (𝑠) is exogenously determined by the market, the developer has
three decision variables (2 pricing and 1 quality decisions) in Case P12; two decision variables
(1 pricing and 1 quality decisions) in Cases P1 and P2; and one decision variable (1 quality
decision) in Cases F1, F2, and F12.
Table 2. There are six strategies, denoted as Cases F1, F2, and F12 (free app cases) and P1, P2,
and P12 (paid app cases). Decision variables include 𝑞,

𝑝1 and/or 𝑝2 ; 𝑠 is exogenous unit ad

revenue for free app, and “ − −” means that the developer does not provide app in that platform.
Ad/Paid Version in Product Offering in Six Cases
Free App Cases
Paid App Cases
Case

F1

F2

F12

P1

P2

P12

Platform 1

𝑠

−−

𝑠

𝑝1

−−

𝑝1

Platform 2

−−

𝑠

𝑠

−−

𝑝2

𝑝2

For the objective function in each case, I first examine the strict concavity condition and
then solve the optimal solution for each case when the strict concavity condition holds. By
substituting the optimal solution into the objective function we can obtain the optimal total profit
(denoted by 𝜋𝑛 , 𝑛 ∈ {F1, F2, F12, P1, P2, P12}). Table 3 summarizes the optimal solutions
and results for each case. The optimal conditions for each case are listed in Table 4. Note that
the optimal solution and result for each case in Table 3 are derived only when the corresponding
concavity and feasibility condition (in Table 4) hold.
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Table 3. This table lists the optimal price(s), quality, and total profit for each case when the concavity
condition holds.
Optimal Matrix for the Six Cases
Case
F1

Price/Ad Revenue
(s, −−)

F2

(− −, s)

F12

(s, s)

P1

(

P2

(− −,

P12

𝑘(2𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃1
,
4𝑘𝛽−2𝜃12

𝑞0 −

𝑏
𝑠𝑟𝜃2
+
2𝛽
𝑘𝛽

𝑏
𝛽
𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )
+
𝑘𝛽
𝑞0 −

−−)

𝑘(2𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃2
)
4𝑘𝛽−2𝑟𝜃22

𝑘(𝑞 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃

0
1
(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
2 −𝑟𝜃2 ,
1

Quality
𝑏
𝑠𝜃1
𝑞0 −
+
2𝛽 𝑘𝛽

2

𝑘(𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃2
)
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

𝑘(2𝑞0 𝛽 − 𝑏)
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12
𝑘(2𝑞0 𝛽 − 𝑏)
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝑟𝜃22
2𝑘(𝑞0 𝛽 − 𝑏)
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22
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Total Profit
1
(𝑏 2 𝑘 2 − 4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠𝜃1 ) + 4𝑠(𝑠𝜃12
4𝑘 2 𝛽
+ 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 − 𝑠𝑡)))
1
(𝑏 2 𝑘 2 − 4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )
4𝑘 2 𝛽
+ 4𝑟𝑠(𝑟𝑠𝜃22 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃2
− 𝑠𝑡)))
1
(𝑏 2 𝑘 2 − 2𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 ))
𝑘2𝛽
+ 𝑠(𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )2
+ 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 + 𝑞0 𝑟𝜃2
− (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡)))
𝑏𝑘(𝑏 − 4𝑞0 𝛽) + 2𝑞02 𝛽𝜃12
4𝑘𝛽 − 2𝜃12
𝑏𝑘(𝑏 − 4𝑞0 𝛽) + 2𝑞02 𝑟𝛽𝜃22
4𝑘𝛽 − 2𝑟𝜃22
2
2𝑏 𝑘 − 4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑞02 𝛽(𝜃12 + 𝑟𝜃22 )
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22

Table 4. This table lists the combined condition of concavity and feasibility for the six cases.
𝜃1 > 𝜃2 ,

0<𝑡<1 ,

𝑡1 =

(𝑏𝑘−2𝑠𝜃1 )(𝑏𝑘−4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−2𝑠𝜃1 )
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽

𝜃1 (2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+2𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)
2𝑘𝑠𝛽

,

𝑡4 =

(𝑏𝑘+𝑠𝜃1 (𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))(𝑏𝑘−2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 (𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))
,
2𝑘(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝛽

𝑡6 =

,

𝑡2 =

𝜃2 (2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 −𝑏𝑘)
2𝑘𝑠𝛽

(𝑏𝑘−2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )(𝑏𝑘−4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )
8𝑘𝑟𝑠2 𝛽

,

𝑡3 =

,

𝑡5 =

𝑘𝜃2
.
𝑠(𝜃1 −𝜃2 )

Combined Conditions of Concavity and Feasibility for the Six Cases
Case
Combined conditions of concavity and feasibility
2𝑠𝜃
1
F1 𝑏 <
& 𝑡 < min{𝑡1 , 𝑡3 }
𝑘
F2 𝑏 < 2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 & 𝑡 < min{𝑡 , 𝑡 }
2

𝑘

4

F12 𝑡 < min{𝑡 , 𝑡 } & 𝑞 𝛽 + 𝑠𝜃1 − (𝑘+𝑠𝑡)𝛽 + 𝑟𝑠𝜃2 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝑞 𝛽 + 𝑠(𝜃2 (𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )−𝑘𝑡𝛽)
5 6
0
0
𝑘

𝜃2

𝑘

𝑘𝜃2

P1 𝛽 >
& 𝑏 < 2𝑞0 𝛽 − √2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 )⁄𝑘
2𝑘
P2 𝛽 > 𝑟𝜃22 & 𝑏 < 2𝑞 𝛽 − √2𝑘𝑞 2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝑟𝜃 2 )⁄𝑘
0
0
2
2𝑘
P12 𝛽 > 𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22 & 𝑏 < 𝑞 𝛽 − √𝑘𝑞 2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 − 𝑟𝜃 2 )⁄(√2𝑘)
𝜃12

0

2𝑘

0

1

2

When strict concavity condition holds in any specific case, its optimal solutions can be
obtained by setting first-order conditions to zero. The jointly strict concavity condition is 𝛽 >
𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22
2𝑘

for Case P12, 𝛽 >

𝜃12
2𝑘

for Case P1, and 𝛽 >

𝑟𝜃22
2𝑘

for Case P2, respectively, while Cases

F1, F2 and F12 are always strictly concave at any 𝛽 value.
When the jointly strict concavity does not hold, we have to find optimal solutions
indirectly. The fact that the profit function is strictly concave in a single variable (𝑞, 𝑝1 or 𝑝2 )
but not jointly strictly concave in all variables stems from the interaction between quality and
price variables. I find that at any given quality level, the objective function is always strictly
concave in price decision(s). Therefore, we can reduce the optimization problem by first solving
for the optimal prices as a function of quality (step one), and then substituting the result back to
solve for the optimal quality (step two) (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999). Using this approach, I find
that the profit function derived at step two is strictly convex in quality for all cases (P1, P2, and
P12). Note that the quality level has to be within [𝑞0 , 𝑞̂]. The optimal quality should be set as
𝑞̂ when strict concavity does not hold for Cases P1, P2, and P12 since the profit function is
monotonically increasing with respect to quality. Using Case P12 as an example, when 𝛽 is
greater than

𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22
2𝑘

𝑘(𝑞 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃

0
1
(unbounded situation), the optimal solution (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 ,𝑞) is ( 2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
2 −𝑟𝜃2 ,

2𝑟(𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃2
2𝑘(𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)
,
).
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

1

If 𝛽 is smaller than
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𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22
2𝑘

2

(bounded situation) or the optimal

quality is higher than 𝑞̂, the optimal solution (𝑝1 , 𝑝2 , 𝑞) should be (

𝑞̂𝜃1 𝑞̂𝜃2
, ,
2
2

𝑞̂). Table 5

summarizes the optimal solutions and results for bounded cases P1, P2 and P12.
Table 5. The optimal price(s) and total profit for the three paid app cases when the concavity
condition fails to hold or the optimal quality exceeds the quality upper bound 𝑞̂.
Optimal Matrix for the Bounded Paid Cases
Case
P1

Price/Unit Ad Revenue

P2

(− −,

P12

(

𝑞̂𝜃
( 21,

−−)
𝑞̂𝜃2
)
2

𝑞̂𝜃1 𝑞̂𝜃2
,
)
2
2

Total Profit
𝑞̂ 2 𝜃12
− 𝑏𝑞̂ − (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽
2𝑘
𝑞̂ 2 𝑟𝜃22
− 𝑏𝑞̂ − (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽
2𝑘
𝑞̂ 2 (𝜃12 + 𝑟𝜃22 ) − 4𝑏𝑘𝑞̂ − 2𝑘(𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽
2𝑘

Overall, I find that in a two-platform market, a developer’s product offering strategy is
influenced by app development difficulty level ( 𝛽 ), app launching cost parameter ( 𝑏 ),
consumers’ marginal disutility (𝑘), consumers’ disutility sensitivity to apps (𝑡 for free apps
and 1 for paid apps, respectively), consumers’ willingness to pay (𝜃𝑖 ), consumer densities (1
or 𝑟), and quality upper bound (𝑞̂). Further, I present my major findings and insights in the
following sections. Noting that Platforms 1 and 2 are quasi-symmetric in terms of analysis
results, I assume 𝑟 > 1 and 𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22 for brevity. The above assumption represents the case
that Platform 2 is more profitable (or attractive to app developers) than Platform 1; consequently,
Case P1 is always dominated by Case P2 in paid app cases. With this assumption, I omit lengthy
and symmetric analytical discussion when 𝜃12 > 𝑟𝜃22 . This assumption makes our analysis
consistent with the app industry (iOS as Platform 1 vs. Android as Platform 2), where the market
size of Android is approximately six times that of iOS (International Data Corporation, 2015)
and users in iOS are willing to pay about twice as much as those in Android (e.g., Evans, 2014).
4.1 Paid Apps
As noted earlier, for paid app cases, the developer’s profit function might not be concave.
Denote ̅𝜋̅̅𝑛̅ as the optimal total profit for Case 𝑛
quality is 𝑞̂. I show that either

(n ∈ {P1, P2, P12}) when the optimal

𝜋𝑃2 or ̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃12 can be dominant among all ̅̅
𝜋̅𝑛̅𝑠. Therefore, I

offer Proposition 1 (proofs for all propositions are provided in Appendices):
Proposition 1. Optimal Strategy for Bounded Paid App Offering: For all paid strategies that
optimal app quality is set as 𝑞̂: (1) offering paid versions in both platforms (Case P12) is optimal
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as long as 𝑏 <

𝑞̂𝜃12
;
2𝑘

(2) otherwise, offering a paid version only in the more profitable platform

(Case P2) is optimal. ∎
Proposition 1 implies that in the cases that an app developer strives to exploit the
maximal level of quality with the purpose of gaining app sales revenues from end users, the
optimal strategy would be launching the app in both platforms (for example, iOS and Android)
if the additional cost of launching the app is low enough. However, if an app’s release in each
platform requires a high investment, it becomes optimal to serve only the platform that is
relatively more profitable (i.e., Platform 2 based on our assumption). Notably, the threshold
value of app launching cost (𝑏 <

𝑞̂𝜃12
)
2𝑘

in deciding whether to serve both platforms represents

the WTP of users in the less profitable platform (i.e., Platform 1). In other words, a developer
should always launch its app product in the more profitable platform; offering the same app in
another platform would depend on the developer’s opinion of whether the platform is profitable
enough. Note that offering apps in only Platform 1 is never optimal due to 𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22. In the
case when 𝜃12 > 𝑟𝜃22, Platform 1 will become the first platform choice for the developer. Note
also that although iOS users are, on average, willing to pay more than Android users, the ratio
of 𝜃1 ⁄𝜃2 can be different for different apps. Many apps are available in both iOS and Android
platforms (𝑏 <

𝑞̂𝜃12
).
2𝑘

However, some paid apps such as Press (a RSS reader) and Tasker (a root

access tool) are only available in Android due to their Android-users orientation (for these
developers, 𝜃2 ≫ 𝜃1 ). Some apps such as Super Mario Run game and iAnnotate (PDF note
taker) are only available in iOS probably because the developers think iOS users have higher
WTP (for these developers, 𝜃1 ≫ 𝜃2 ).
On the other hand, in the cases when quality is set lower than the quality upper bound
(𝑞̂) for the app product in achieving optimality, the concavity condition should hold. Similar to
the bounded situation, I show that either Case P2 or P12 can be dominant among the three paid
app cases. Therefore, I offer Proposition 2:
Proposition 2. Optimal Strategy for Unbounded Paid App Offering: For all paid strategies in
which optimal app quality is lower than 𝑞̂, (i) offering a paid version exclusively in the more
profitable platform (Case P2) is optimal only when 𝑟 <

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

; (ii)

otherwise, offering paid versions in both platforms (Case P12) is optimal. Case P1 is never
optimal. ∎
Proposition 2 suggests that the developer should launch its app product in the more
profitable platform. However, whether it should offer the same version of the app in the other
16

platform depends on the user density (𝑟) in the more profitable platform. Specifically, launching
only in Platform 2 (Case P2) dominates launching in both platforms (Case P12) when Platform
2’s user density is small (𝑟 <
𝑟 > 1 , if

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
).
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

Note that given our assumption of

is less than 1, then Case P12 will be optimal in all

conditions. This proposition also implies that when the more profitable platform has a
substantial user density (𝑟 >

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
),
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

launching in two platforms is always

preferable. Case P1 in unbounded paid app is never optimal due to 𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22 .
I am interested in how the developer optimizes product prices in different platforms. By
comparing results in different platforms, I find that the developer should always set the app price
higher in the platform that has a higher WTP; that is, if 𝜃1 > 𝜃2, then 𝑝1∗ > 𝑝2∗ , and vice versa.
In the mobile app market, I notice that for those paid apps offered in both iOS and Android, the
price is often lower in Android than in iOS (Evans, 2014). At those optimal prices, a higher
price does not always lead to a lower realized demand (represented by 𝑚𝑖,𝑗 ); to be more specific,
I find that 𝑚1,𝑝1∗ < 𝑚2,𝑝2∗ only when 𝜃1 < 𝑟𝜃2 , and 𝑚1,𝑝1∗ > 𝑚2,𝑝2∗ otherwise. For example,
since Android’s user base is six times that of iOS’, the app developer can actually generate
reasonable revenues by capturing more users from Android even when it is offered at a lower
price in Android than it is in iOS. By comparing Cases P1, P2, and P12, I find that the optimal
prices, quality and derived demands in dual-platform (P12) are always higher than those in
∗
∗
∗
∗
single platforms (P1 and P2), which means 𝑞𝑃12
> 𝑞𝑃𝑖
, 𝑝𝑖,𝑃12
> 𝑝𝑖,𝑃𝑖
, and 𝑚𝑖,𝑃12 > 𝑚𝑖,𝑃𝑖 ,

where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.
Propositions 1 and 2 apply to the paid mobile app market as well as the computer
software market. In the computer software market, it was reported that the WTPs in both
platforms (Windows and Mac) are similar (𝜃1 ≅ 𝜃2 ) and that Windows’ market is 14 times as
large as Mac’s (r = 14) (netmarketshare.com, 2016). In the real market, I also find that for many
developers such as Adobe, launching in both platforms is their strategy due to a larger r
(Proposition 2). However, for developers of apps such as Minitab (a statistical tool), the
parameter setting might be the reason that the app is still not offered to be directly installed on
Mac.
4.2 Free Apps
When a developer chooses to offer a free app and gain advertisement revenue, there are
three cases: platform 1 only (Case F1), platform 2 only (Case F2), and both platforms (Case
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F12). Different from paid strategies in section 4.1 where Case P1 is dominated by Case P2, in
free strategies all three cases (F1, F2, and F12) can be dominant under certain conditions, and
the optimal condition depends on free app users’ disutility sensitivity. Proposition 3 provides
details of our finding.
Proposition 3. Optimal Strategy for Unbounded Free App Offering: For all free strategies in
which optimal app quality is lower than 𝑞̂, (i) offering free versions in both platforms (Case
F12) is optimal as long as free app users’ disutility sensitivity is 𝑡 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜑1 , 𝜑2 }; (ii) offering
a free version in only Platform 2 (Case F2) is optimal as long as

𝜑2 < 𝑡 < 𝜑3 ; and (iii)

offering a free version in only Platform 1 (Case F1) is optimal as long as
where: 𝜑1 =
𝜑3 =

(𝑏𝑘−2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )(3𝑏𝑘−4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−2𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))
8𝑘𝑟𝑠2 𝛽

(𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃1 )(2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏𝑘+𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))
.
2𝑘(𝑟−1)𝑠𝛽

, 𝜑2 =

𝑡 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜑1 , 𝜑3 },

(𝑏𝑘−2𝑠𝜃1 )(3𝑏𝑘−4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−2𝑠(𝜃1 +2𝑟𝜃2 ))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽

and

∎

Note that while the order among 𝜑1 , 𝜑2 , and 𝜑3 is uncertain, there might be six
scenarios of order for the three critical values of 𝑡. As a result, when none of the conditions (i),
(ii), and (iii) hold, the developer needs to compare 𝜋𝐹1, 𝜋𝐹2, and 𝜋𝐹12 to find the optimal
case. Fig. 2 demonstrates that while the favorable conditions for Cases F1, F2, and F12 align
with Proposition 3, the optimal conditions of Cases F1, F2, and F12 are different.
Fig. 2. Threshold of App Users Disutility Sensitivity for Free App Offering Strategy
Dominance. This figure shows how free app users’ disutility sensitivities impact the dominance
of free app offering strategies. In each scenario, the order among 𝜑1 , 𝜑2 and 𝜑3 is sure. With
that order, in each separate space, one case is dominant or it is unclear which strategy is
dominant. For instance, in scenario (a), when 𝑡 < 𝜑1 , Case F12 is dominant; when
𝜑1 < 𝑡 < 𝜑2 , analytically no case is certainly dominant. "(F1, F2, F12)" means that the
developer needs to compare profits of all cases to find the optimal strategy.

Proposition 3 implies that the developer should examine users’ disutility sensitivity (𝑡)
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when determining the optimal product offering strategy for a free app. Specifically, if app users
are highly tolerant of advertisements (i.e., 𝑡 is very low), the developer most likely will offer
the free app in both platforms (iOS and Android). By doing so, the developer can capture as
many users as possible while still placing advertisements in the app targeting those users,
thereby gaining as much revenue as possible. However, if app users are intolerant of
advertisements (i.e., 𝑡 is close to 1), the developer should focus on only one platform. I observe
that some free apps in the current marketplace (e.g., Facebook) are available in both iOS and
Android, while other free apps that are offered in only iOS (e.g., Fresh Air, a weather app) or
Android (e.g., Muzei, a live wallpaper app), and I believe that developers of different free apps
may face different user segments and market conditions.
In addition, I find that the free app’s optimal quality and derived demand in dualplatform strategy (Case F12) are always higher than those in single-platform strategies (Cases
∗
∗
F1 and F2), as in 𝑞𝐹12
> 𝑞𝐹𝑖
and 𝑚𝑖,𝐹12 > 𝑚𝑖,𝐹𝑖 , where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. In contrast to single-

platform strategies, two-platform strategies enable the developer to generate higher gross
revenue from larger realized demand; however, the additional cost of launching the app in an
extra platform cannot guarantee that F12 is always a dominant strategy. In other words, when
choosing whether to enter an additional platform, the developer has to make sure the additional
costs of launching the same app in that platform will be offset by the incremental advertisement
revenues, which is affected by users’ tolerance to advertisements.
Since the app quality in bounded free app cases is set at the same level in all of the three
∗
cases (i.e., 𝑞𝐹𝑖
= 𝑞̂ ( 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, 12}) , developers need only decide on platform selection.

Proposition 4 summarizes our finding for free strategies when app quality reaches the upper
limit.
Proposition 4. Optimal Strategy for Bounded Free App Offering: For all free strategies in which
optimal app quality is 𝑞̂, launching in both platforms (Case F12) is optimal as long as app
launching cost is 𝑏 <

2𝑞̂𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )−2(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝑡−𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽
2𝑘𝑞̂

and free app users’ disutility sensitivity

is 𝑡 < min{𝑞̂ 𝜃1 ⁄𝑠 , 𝑞̂ 𝜃2 ⁄𝑠}; otherwise, launching in only Platform 1 (Case F1) is dominant
𝜃 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡

𝜃 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡

when 𝑟 < 𝜃1 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡, and launching in Platform 2 (Case F2) is dominant when 𝑟 > 𝜃1 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡. ∎
2

2

Proposition 4 implies that when 𝑞 = 𝑞̂, both high users’ tolerance of advertisements in
free apps (𝑡 < min{𝑞̂ 𝜃1 ⁄𝑠 , 𝑞̂ 𝜃2 ⁄𝑠} , thus rendering a higher realized demand) and low app
launching costs

(𝑏 <

2𝑞̂𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )−2(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝑡−𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽
,
2𝑘𝑞̂

thus extra revenue from another

platform will cover app launching costs) are required for the developer to launch a free app in
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both platforms. When those two conditions do not hold, the optimal strategy depends on the
user densities and WTPs in the two platforms. Our result shows that a two-platform strategy
(bounded Case F12) results in higher quality level and higher realized demand compared to that
in any one-platform strategy (bounded Cases F1 and F2); that is, 𝑞𝐹12 > 𝑞𝐹𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖,𝐹12 >
𝑚𝑖,𝐹𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.
Thus far, I have investigated the strategies for either paid or free apps separately. In the
next subsection I relax the assumption that the developer has a pre-determined paid or free
strategy in launching its app. I am interested in how app users’ tolerance to advertisements
affects a developer’s strategic platform choice. For analytical tractability, I only consider the
situation when the developer has already chosen which platform(s) to serve (i.e., either one or
two platforms) and now needs to decide whether to offer the product as a free or paid app.
4.3 When Should Developers Adopt Free or Paid Strategies?
In this section, I compare corresponding free and paid contexts when the quality levels
are lower than the quality upper bound (𝑞 ∗ < 𝑞̂). Regarding the contexts in which free or paid
app options are optimal, I offer Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Releasing a free version of an app (compared to a paid version) is a better choice
if users' disutility sensitivity to advertisements ( 𝑡 ) is smaller than φ4 for two-platform
strategies (𝜋𝐹12 > 𝜋𝑃12 ), φ5 when launching the app in only Platform 1 (𝜋𝐹1 > 𝜋𝑃1), and φ6
when

launching

the

app

in

only

Platform

2

( 𝜋𝐹2 > 𝜋𝑃2 ),

where:

φ4 =

(2𝑘 3 𝛽(𝑏−𝑞0 𝛽)2 −(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 )−
2𝑟𝑠(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 )+𝑟 2 𝑠2 𝜃22 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 ))

,

(2𝑘(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 ))

φ5 =

𝜃1 (𝜃13 +8𝑘𝑠𝛽𝜃1 (𝑠−𝑞0 𝜃1 )−𝑏2 𝑘 2 𝜃1 −4𝑠2 −
2
4𝑘 𝑞0 𝛽 2 (𝑞0 𝜃1 −4𝑠)+4𝑏𝑘(𝑠𝜃12 +𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 −2𝑠)))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 )

,

and

φ6 =

𝜃2 (8𝑘𝑟𝑠𝛽𝜃2 (𝑠−𝑞0 𝜃2 )−𝑏2 𝑘 2 𝜃2 −4𝑟 2 𝜃23 −
2
4𝑘 𝑞0 𝛽 2 (𝑞0 𝜃2 −4𝑠)+4𝑏𝑘(𝑟𝑠𝜃22 +𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃2 −2𝑠)))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝑟𝜃22 )

.∎

Note that 𝑡 represents both the disutility sensitivity for free apps and the disutility gap
between paid users and free-with-ads users; the lower 𝑡 is, the higher the disutility gap users
perceive between paid and free apps. Proposition 5 implies that for the same group of app users
more tolerant to the disutility arisen from pop-up advertisements yet relatively sensitive to a
paid app' s price, a developer gains more advantage from providing a free version rather than a
paid version. Proposition 5 also indicates that developers choosing to launch a free app instead
of a paid app in both platforms, a larger disutility gap is required (i.e., smaller 𝑡). Note that if
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any of φ4 , φ5 , or φ6 is smaller than zero, the paid case dominates the corresponding free
case; if any of φ4 , φ5 , or φ6 is greater than 1, the free case dominates the corresponding paid
case. Many apps (e.g., Facebook) are free in both iOS and Android; some free apps that are
offered in only Android (e.g., Solid Explorer) or iOS (e.g., Fresh Air).
4.4 Static Sensitivity Analysis
I conduct a static sensitivity analysis in order to examine the impact of each parameter
on corresponding optimal metrics for the unbounded cases. The sensitivity analysis results
shown in Table 6 present several additional insights. First, both user density and users’ WTP (𝜃𝑖 )
are positively related to all of the optimal metrics, including product quality (𝑞), price (𝑝𝑖 ),
demand in each platform (𝑚𝑖 ), total cost (𝑇𝐶), and total profit (𝜋). Second, for free cases, prior
quality level (𝑞0 ) is positively related to all of the other resulting variables; however, for paid
cases, the positive association between prior app quality and total cost (or total profit) becomes
uncertain. Third, users’ disutility sensitivity to advertisement (𝑡) negative impacts a free app’s
demand and the total profit generated by a developer, yet it does not affect the optimal quality
of the app. Also, the app launching cost parameter (𝑏) is negatively associated with app quality,
realized demand, and total profit. Lastly, for paid cases, users’ marginal disutility (𝑘) negatively
affects all of the resulting variables; however, for free cases, it remains unclear whether users’
marginal disutility can negatively influence demand and total profit. Also, app development
difficulty parameter (𝛽) has negative impact on quality, realized demands, and total cost in free
cases; however, its impacts on quality, realized demands, and total cost are uncertain in paid
cases.
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Table 6. This table summarizes the results of a static sensitivity analysis. The parameters in the
first column are the changing variables. For each row, I increase (↑ as increasing) the value of
the changing variable while keeping other parameters’ values unchanged, and examine how
every resulting outcome reacts. For example, increasing unit ad revenue (𝑠 ↑) will result in an
increase of optimal total profit (𝜋 ∗ ↑) in Case F1. The symbol “↑ (↓)” means increase (decrease),
“~” means “indeterminate”, “NC” means no impact, and “NA” means “not applicable”.
Comparative Statics
Free Cases
𝑞∗
𝒔↑
↑
𝒒𝟎 ↑
↑
𝜷 ↑
↓
𝒌 ↑
↓
𝐫 ↑
NA

F1
𝑚1∗
~
↑
↓
~
NA

𝑇𝐶 ∗
↑
↑
↓
↓
NA

𝜋∗
~
↑
↓
~
NA

𝑚2∗
~
↑
↓
~
↑

F2
𝑇𝐶 ∗
↑
↑
↓
↓
↑

NA

NA

NA

↑

↑

↑

↑

↓
NC

↓
↓

~
NC
P2
𝑚2∗
↑
~
↓
↑
NA

↓
↓

𝜽𝟏 ↑

↑

↑

↑

𝜽𝟐 ↑

NA

NA

NA

𝒃 ↑
↓
𝒕 ↑
NC
Paid Cases
𝑞∗
𝒒𝟎 ↑
↑
𝜷 ↑
~
𝒌 ↑
↓
𝐫 ↑
NA
𝜽𝟏 ↑
↑

↓
↓

~
NC

↓
↓

𝑝1∗
↑
~
↓
NA
↑

𝑚1∗
↑
~
↓
NA
↑

𝑇𝐶 ∗
~
~
↓
NA
↑

P1
𝜋∗
~
↓
↓
NA
↑

𝑞∗
↑
~
↓
↑
NA

𝑝2∗
↑
~
↓
↑
NA

𝜽𝟐 ↑

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

↑

↑

↑

𝒃 ↑

↓

↓

↓

~

↓

↓

↓

↓

5.

↑

𝑞∗
↑
↑
↓
↓
↑

NA

𝜋∗

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↓
NC

↓
↓

↓
↓

𝜋∗
~
↓
↓
↑
NA

𝑞∗
↑
~
↓
↑
↑

𝑝1∗ 𝑝2∗
↑
↑
~ ~
↓
↓
↑
↑
↑
↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↑

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

↓

~
↑
NA

↑

↑

↑

↑
↓

~

𝜋∗
~
↑
↓
~
↑

𝑚1∗ 𝑚2∗
~ ~
↑
↑
↓
↓
~ ~
↑
↑

~

𝑇𝐶 ∗
~
~
↓
↑
NA

F12
𝑇𝐶 ∗
↑
↑
↓
↓
↑

𝑞∗
↑
↑
↓
↓
↑

~
↓
NC
↓
P12
𝑚1∗
𝑚2∗
↑
↑
~
~
↓
↓
↑
↑
↑
↑

Numerical Examples
In this section I conduct numerical examples to investigate the dynamics of app offering

problems. In the mobile app industry, I consider iOS and Android as the two platforms that a
developer considers. Given that Android’s market size is about six times larger than
iOS’(International Data Corporation, 2015), I treat iOS and Android as Platforms 1 and 2,
respectively, and set 𝑟 = 6. According to Evans (2014), iOS users are willing to spend about
twice the amount as Android users. I thus simply set 𝜃1 = 20 and 𝜃2 = 10, respectively. For
simplicity, I assume that users’ marginal disutility parameter (𝑘) is 50. I use Facetune as an
example app. Facetune is an easy to use app that edits portrait and selfie pictures. The developer
of Facetune charges $3.99 and $2.99 for iOS and Android users, respectively. Assume the
developer’s prior quality level (𝑞0 ) and quality upper bound (𝑞̂) are 10 and 20, respectively; app
development difficulty level (𝛽) is 12 and app launching cost parameter (𝑏) is 1. The result
shows that optimal total profit in Case P12 is the highest among the three paid app cases. Given
that 𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22 in this setting, the above result is consistent with Proposition 2 (i.e., the optimal
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𝑇𝐶 ∗
~
~
↓
↑
↑

𝜋∗
~
↓
↓
↑
↑

↑

↑

~

↓

strategy is to provide paid versions of the app in both platforms because 𝑟 >
2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
.).
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

In Fig. 3, I plot the dominant regions of paid app cases by varying

user density in Platform 2 (𝑟) and app launching cost parameters (𝑏). When 𝑟 < 4 only Cases
P1 and P12 can be optimal; when 𝑟 > 4 only Cases P1 and P12 can be optimal (𝑟 = 4 is the
dividing line of 𝜃12 = 𝑟𝜃22 ). I observe that Case P12’s favorable condition occurs when the app
launching cost (𝑏) is low; when the app launching cost is high, a single-platform option (Cases
P1 or P2) is preferred. I also suggest that the firm sets its quality level to its upper bound (𝑞̂)
when user density in Platform 2 is higher than a certain level, where bounded cases are optimal.
Fig. 3 also indicates that when the user density in Platform 2 is low and the app launching cost
is high, the app developer should not develop the app.
Fig. 3. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Paid App Offering. This figure
illustrates the dominance among the three paid app cases along with changing values of user
density in Platform 2 (𝑟) and app launching cost parameter (𝑏). I set 𝑞0 = 10, 𝑞̂ = 20, 𝛽 =
12, 𝜃1 = 20, 𝜃2 = 10, and 𝑘 = 50. P2B and P12B are P2 and P12 with 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂, respectively.

In the second example, I perform numerical analysis for free app strategies (i.e., Cases
F1, F2, and F12). I set the parameter values as follows: 𝑟 = 6, 𝜃1 = 20, 𝜃2 = 10, 𝛽 = 12,
𝑘 = 30, 𝑞0 = 10, 𝑞̂ = 15, and 𝑡 = 0.6. I plot these three cases in a plane in which the unit ad
revenue (𝑠) ranges between 3 and 60 and the app launching cost (𝑏) ranges between 5 and 60.
In Fig. 4 I find that Case F12 is favored when 𝑠 is large and 𝑏 is small, and Case F2 is favored
when 𝑏 is large at any given value of 𝑠. The thick border line separates between Cases F12
and F2. In Fig. 4, the dashed line shows where the optimal quality reaches its upper bound; this
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dashed line shifts to the right if the quality upper bound becomes larger. The developer should
design its app to its quality upper bound when 𝑠 is relatively large and 𝑏 is relatively small.
Note that, in the two single-platform cases (Cases F1 and F2), one case is always dominated by
another (Case F1 is dominated by Case F2 in the setting) when we present the optimal case in a
two-dimension plane.
Fig. 4. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Free App Offering. This figure
illustrates how app launching cost parameter (𝑏) and unit ad revenue (𝑠) influence the optimal
total profits for the three free app cases. I set 𝑟 = 6, 𝜃1 = 20 and 𝜃2 = 10, 𝛽 = 12, 𝑘 =
30, 𝑞0 = 10, 𝑞̂ = 15, and 𝑡 = 0.6. F2B and F12B are F2 and F12 with 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂, respectively.
Case F1 is dominated by Case F2 in this setting.

In the last example, I compare two-platform strategies between paid and free app
offerings (Cases F12 and P12). I explore situations in which a developer should launch a paid
or free version for its app product. I allow users’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) to vary in each
platform (𝜃𝑖 ) but fix the values of other parameters as follows: 𝑟 = 6, 𝑠 = $30, 𝑡 = 0.5, 𝛽 =
12, 𝑘 = 30, 𝑞0 = 5, 𝑞̂ = 50, and 𝑏 = 10. Fig. 5 demonstrates the dynamics with this setting.
I find that users’ WTP in each platform is positively associated with total profit in both Cases
F12 and P12, since higher WTP leads to higher quality level and realized demand for the
developer. Furthermore, I find that when users in Platform 1 are less willing to pay (𝜃1 < 9 in
this example), offering a free app (Case F12) is the better choice (Case P12); otherwise, when
users in that platform are very willing to pay (𝜃1 > 9), the developer should adopt a paid strategy.
In short, the choice between paid and free strategies depends on the relative WTP levels between
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the two platforms. It is significant that users’ WTP positively impacts developer’s total profit;
conversely, users’ disutility sensitivity to advertisement or app price negatively affects the
developer’s total profit. Therefore, the above results are consistent with Proposition 5.
Fig. 5. Users' Willingness-to-Pay and Dominant Two-Platform Strategies. Focusing on twoplatform strategies, this figure presents how users’ willingness-to-pay in Platforms 1 and 2 (𝜃1
and 𝜃2 , respectively) influences the profits of Case F12 (offering free app in both platforms)
and Case P12 (offering paid app in both platforms). Assume that 𝑟 = 6, 𝑠 = $30, 𝑡 = 0.5,
𝛽 = 12, 𝑘 = 30, 𝑞0 = 5, 𝑞̂ = 50, and 𝑏 = 10. With this setting, approximately, when 𝜃1 >
9, P12 is dominant; when 𝜃1 < 9, F12 is dominant; when 𝜃1 is very small, neither case is
feasible.

6.

Conclusion and Future Extension
In this paper, I develop a stylized model for analyzing developers’ app offering strategy

when facing two platforms. My model incorporates several characteristics of the app market:
different willingness-to-pays across platforms, different sizes of user base, different users’
disutility sensitivities to free and paid apps, app launching costs in each platform, and potential
app quality upper bounds. The major contribution of this paper is that it enriches productoffering literature for two-sided markets by providing decision rules from the perspective of app
developers. The results I got can also apply to a context in which advertisement revenue is
25

absent and only a paid app is offered (e.g., computer app market). From my analysis and
numerical examples, I derive several substantive insights.
First, I find that in paid app contexts, a developer should launch its app product in the
more profitable platform; whether the developer should also launch the same app in the other
platform depends on the app launching cost. Specifically, when the quality of the app developed
reaches its upper limit, launching in both platforms is always optimal as long as the app
launching cost is low. Also, when the app quality does not reach the upper bound, launching in
two platforms is always preferable as long as the more profitable platform has significant
advantage (user base and/or WTP) relative to the other. For free app strategies, I find that
launching in two platforms is a better choice if app users are highly tolerant of advertisements
embedded within apps. I suggest that developers identify the more profitable (or attractive)
platform when deciding on their app offering strategies. A platform’s attractiveness can be
determined through users’ willingness to pay and user base size in the potential platform. In
other words, the developer should balance revenues (from either app sales or in-app advertising)
from entering a platform and the app launching cost.
Second, I show that if users’ disutility sensitivity to advertisement is minimal compared
with sensitivity to app price, it is better to provide free apps rather than paid apps (Proposition
5). Also, among all cases in which free apps are offered, the developer should launch free apps
in both platforms when users have low disutility sensitivity to in-app advertisement (Proposition
3). In practice, since an app developer usually decides whether to charge end-users and how
much to charge, knowing user disutility sensitivity to in-app advertisement is critical to an app
developer’s decision. Note that this disutility sensitivity for different app categories and user
segments may vary significantly. I observe that there are more free apps for gaming than for
free apps that provide great productivity (e.g., PDF note taking app or professional video editing
app); hence, app developers should understand their target segments and users well since the
market conditions for different apps vary greatly.
Finally, I provide analytical results of optimal app quality and prices for any cases
considered in my model. I find that factors such as user density and willingness to pay in
different platforms, app development and launching cost parameters, inherited quality level,
quality upper bound, unit advertisement revenue, and consumers’ disutility sensitivity to
advertisement affect the optimal quality and pricing decisions. However, the platform selection
decision primarily hinged on users’ densities and willingness to pay in different platforms, and
on consumers’ disutility sensitivity to advertisements. The results derived also suggest that the
paid app in a platform with higher willingness-to-pay should be priced higher. If the developer
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decides to offer an app (paid or free) in both platforms, the app’s quality and prices (only applied
to paid app case) should be set higher.
There are several limitations of the present paper that may point to directions for future
research. First, I assume that a developer considers providing only one app (free or paid) in any
platform. A multi-platform and multi-product offering strategy can be a future research
extension. Second, in-app purchases have become an important revenue source for app
developers (Hyam, 2016), and many apps are offered as a “freemium” in which users have an
option to upgrade once they try using and subsequently enjoy the app. A two-stage decision
model may be suitable for app offering strategies with in-app purchase options. Third, my model
assumes equivalent app launching cost for different platforms. In practice, the launching cost
could be platform specific for a developer. Complicated with different user bases and WTPs
across multiple platforms (e.g., Windows, Mac, and Linux in computer market), platform
selection for app development may have different criteria. Fourth, due to the complexity of my
current model, the present research does not address the situation in which a developer offers a
free app in one platform but a paid version in another platform. Future studies that examine this
scenario would be a valued direction for future examination. Last, I assume a developer as a
monopolist within the marketplace in the model. Future research could also consider developer
competition to extend my model.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof for Proposition 1.
Among all of the six cases, in Cases P1 (offering paid version in only Platform 1), P2
(offering paid version in only Platform 2) and P12 (offering paid version in both platforms)
strict concavity condition may not hold within certain 𝛽 ranges. For these three cases, when
strict concavity conditions fail to hold, the optimal total profits obtained are shown in Table 5,
i.e.:

𝜋𝑃1 =
̅̅̅̅̅

𝑞̂2 θ21
2𝑘

− 𝑏𝑞̂ − (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽 ,

𝜋𝑃2 =
̅̅̅̅̅

𝑞̂2 𝑟θ22
2𝑘

− 𝑏𝑞̂ − (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽 ,

and

𝜋𝑃12 =
̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝑞̂2 (θ21 +𝑟θ22 )−4𝑏𝑘𝑞̂−2𝑘(𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽
.
2𝑘

Since I have assumed “𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22” (i.e., Platform 2 is more attractive), ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃2 − ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃1 =
𝑞̂2 (𝑟θ22 −θ21 )
2𝑘

> 0 always holds, meaning Case P1 is always dominated by Case P2.
𝑞̂θ21
𝑘

1
2

Additionally, I have ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃12 − ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃2 = 𝑞̂(
𝑞̂θ21
),
2𝑘

− 2𝑏). Hence, if

𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃2 > 0; otherwise, ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃12 − ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃2 ≤ 0 if 𝑏 ≥
𝑃12 − ̅̅̅̅̅

𝑞̂θ21
𝑘

− 2𝑏 > 0 (or 𝑏 <

𝑞̂θ21
.
2𝑘

In summary, among the three paid version cases when optimal app quality level is
bounded at the upper bound level (𝑞̂), either Case P12 (when 𝑏 <
𝑞̂θ21
)
2𝑘

𝑞̂θ21
)
2𝑘

or Case P2 (when 𝑏 >

is optimal.

Appendix B: Proof for Proposition 2.
There are three paid app strategies in our research setting: Cases P1 (paid version in only
Platform 1), P2 (paid version in only Platform 2) and P12 (paid version in both platforms). The
fact that the optimal app quality is lower than quality upper bound (i.e., 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂) indicates that
the concavity condition is satisfied in these cases. Hence, the optimal total profits obtained are
shown in Table 3, i.e.: 𝜋𝑃1 =

𝑏𝑘(𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+2𝑞02 𝛽𝜃12
,
4𝑘𝛽−2𝜃12

𝜋𝑃2 =

𝑏𝑘(𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+2𝑞02 𝑟𝛽𝜃22
,
4𝑘𝛽−2𝑟𝜃22

and 𝜋𝑃12 =

2𝑏2 𝑘−4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑞02 𝛽(𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22 )
.
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

Since I have assumed “𝜃12 < 𝑟𝜃22” (i.e., Platform 2 is more attractive), I deduce that
𝑘(𝑏−2q0𝛽)2 (𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃2 )

2
1
𝜋𝑃2 − 𝜋𝑃1 = 2(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )(2𝑘𝛽−𝑟𝜃
2 ) > 0 always holds, meaning that Case P1 is always dominated
1

2

by Case P2.
Additionally,

I

offer

that:

𝑏𝑘(𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+2𝑞02 𝑟𝛽𝜃22
4𝑘𝛽−2𝑟𝜃22
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𝜋𝑃12 − 𝜋𝑃2 =

2𝑏2 𝑘−4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑞02 𝛽(𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22 )
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

−

𝑘(𝑏−2𝑞 𝛽)2

2𝑘(𝑏−𝑞 𝛽)2

0
0
= 2(−2𝑘𝛽+𝑟𝜃
2 ) − −2𝑘𝛽+𝜃2 +𝑟𝜃2 .
2

To make 𝜋𝑃12 − 𝜋𝑃2 > 0 ,

𝛽)2

𝑘(𝑏−2𝑞0
2(−2𝑘𝛽+𝑟𝜃22 )

+

1

𝛽)2

2𝑘(𝑏−𝑞0
−2𝑘𝛽+𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22

2

> 0 must hold. The above

inequality can be transformed to −(𝑏 − 2𝑞0 𝛽)2 (2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 ) + 2(𝑏 − 𝑞0 𝛽)2 (2(2𝑘𝛽 −
𝑟𝜃22 )) > 0

=>

6𝑏 2 𝑘 2 𝛽 − 8𝑏𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝛽 2 + 𝑏 2 𝑘𝜃12 − 4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝛽𝜃12 + 4𝑘𝑞02 𝛽2 𝜃12 − 3𝑏 2 𝑘𝑟𝜃22 +

4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝑟𝛽𝜃22 > 0
=> (𝑏 − 2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12 + 𝑏(3𝑏 − 4𝑞0 𝛽)(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝑟𝜃22 ) > 0

Eq. (B.1).

Since 2𝑘𝛽 − 𝑟𝜃22 > 0 (concavity condition for Case P2), Eq. (B.1) holds if 𝑏 >

4𝑞0 𝛽
.
3

However, given 𝑏 < 𝑞0 𝛽 − √𝑘𝑞02 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 )⁄(√2𝑘) (feasibility condition for Case
P12), 𝑏 >

4𝑞0 𝛽
3

would never occur. Hence, if 𝑏 <

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

4𝑞0 𝛽
,
3

Eq. (B.1) can hold only when 𝑟 >

. In other words, 𝜋𝑃2 > 𝜋𝑃12 only when 𝑏 <

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
.
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

Further, 𝑏 <

4𝑞0 𝛽
3

4𝑞0 𝛽
3

and 𝑟 <

always hold as 𝑏 < 𝑞0 𝛽 (feasibility condition

for Case P12). So 𝜋𝑃2 > 𝜋𝑃12 only when 𝑟 <

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

In summary, for paid app strategies when optimal app quality does not reach quality
upper bound, Case P2 is dominant if 𝑟 <

2𝑏𝑘𝛽(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2 𝜃12
;
𝑏(3𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃22

otherwise, Case P12 is

dominant.
Appendix C: Proof for Proposition 3.
There are three free app strategies in our research setting: Cases F1 (free version in only
Platform 1), F2 (free version in only Platform 2) and F12 (free version in both platforms). The
objective functions of these three cases are all strictly concave. Assuming “𝑟 > 1 and 𝜃12 <
𝑟𝜃22” and that the optimal quality does not exceed the quality upper bound (𝑞̂), I obtain the
optimal total profits which are shown in Table 3, i.e.:
1

𝜋𝐹1 = 4𝑘 2 𝛽 (𝑏 2 𝑘 2 − 4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠𝜃1 ) + 4𝑠(𝑠𝜃12 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 − 𝑠𝑡))),
1

𝜋𝐹2 = 4𝑘 2 𝛽 (𝑏 2 𝑘 2 − 4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑟𝑠𝜃2 ) + 4𝑟𝑠(𝑟𝑠𝜃22 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃2 − 𝑠𝑡))), and
𝜋𝐹12 =

1
(𝑏 2 𝑘 2
𝑘2𝛽

− 2𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )) + 𝑠(𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )2 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 + 𝑞0 𝑟𝜃2 −

(1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡))).
Thus, 𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋𝐹1 =

3𝑏2 𝑘 2 +4𝑟𝑠(2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃2 −𝑠𝑡)+𝑠𝜃2 (2𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))−4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠(𝜃1 +2𝑟𝜃2 ))
;
4𝑘 2 𝛽
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and so

𝜋𝐹12 > 𝜋𝐹1 if 𝑡 <=
Also,

(𝑏𝑘−2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )(3𝑏𝑘−4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−4𝑠𝜃1 −2𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )
8𝑘𝑟𝑠2 𝛽

𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋𝐹2 =

𝜋𝐹12 > 𝜋𝐹2 if 𝑡 <=

𝜋𝐹2 > 𝜋𝐹1 if 𝑡 <=

3𝑏2 𝑘 2 −4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+2𝑠𝜃1 +𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )+4𝑠(2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 −𝑠𝑡)+𝑠𝜃1 (𝜃1 +2𝑟𝜃2 ))
4𝑘 2 𝛽

(2𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)(4𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−3𝑏𝑘+2𝑠(𝜃1 +2𝑟𝜃2 ))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽

In addition,

= 𝜑1 .

𝜋𝐹2 − 𝜋𝐹1 =

so

= 𝜑2 .

𝑠(𝑠(𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃1 )(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )+𝑘(2(𝑟−1)𝑠𝑡𝛽+(2𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)(𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃1 )))
𝑘2𝛽

(𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃1 )(2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏𝑘+𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 ))
2𝑘(𝑟−1)𝑠𝛽

;

; thus

= 𝜑3 .

In summary, Case F12 is dominant if 𝑡 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜑1 , 𝜑2 }; Case F2 is dominant if 𝜑2 <
𝑡 < 𝜑3 ;

and Case F1 is dominant if 𝑡 > 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜑1 , 𝜑3 }.

Appendix D: Proof for Proposition 4.
𝑞∗ =

Similar to the situation in Proposition 3, there are three free app strategies when
𝑞̂

in our research setting: Cases F1 (free version in only Platform 1), F2 (free version in only

Platform 2) and F12 (free version in both platforms). I obtain the optimal total profits which are
shown in Table 5 (i.e. 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
𝐹1 =

2𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃1 −𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

− (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽 − 𝑏𝑞̂ , ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹2 =

2𝑟𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃2 −𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

− (𝑞̂ −

𝑞0 )2 𝛽 − 𝑏𝑞̂, and
𝜋𝐹12 =
̅̅̅̅̅̅

2𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃1 −𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

+

2𝑟𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃2 −𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

Thus, ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
𝐹1 =
2𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃1 −𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

𝑞̂ ),

− (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽 − 2𝑏𝑞̂ ).

2𝑟𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃2 −𝑠𝑡)
−
𝑘

𝑏𝑞̂ = ̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹2 + (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽 > 0 , and ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
𝐹2 =

− 𝑏𝑞̂=𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽 > 0. Therefore, when all free cases are bounded (i.e., 𝑞 ∗ =
𝐹1 + (𝑞

Case

F12

is

dominant

2𝑞̂𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )−2(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝑡−𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽
and
2𝑘𝑞̂

When 𝑏 >

as

long

as

Case

F12

is

feasible

(i.e.,

𝑏<

𝑡 < min{𝑞̂ 𝜃1 ⁄𝑠 , 𝑞̂ 𝜃2 ⁄𝑠}).

2𝑞̂𝑠(𝜃1 +𝑟𝜃2 )−2(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝑡−𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽
2𝑘𝑞̂

and/or 𝑡 > min{𝑞̂ 𝜃1 ⁄𝑠 , 𝑞̂ 𝜃2 ⁄𝑠} , Case

F12 is infeasible. In this situation, I need only compare Cases F1 and F2. 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹1 =
𝐹2 − ̅̅̅̅̅
2𝑠((𝑟−1)𝑠𝑡+𝑞̂(𝑟𝜃2 −𝜃1 ))
.
𝑘

𝜃 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡

𝜃 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡

1
Thus, 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹1 < 0 if 𝑟 < 𝜃1 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡.
𝐹2 − 𝜋
𝐹1 > 0 if 𝑟 > 𝜃 𝑞̂−𝑠𝑡 and 𝜋
𝐹2 − ̅̅̅̅̅
2

2

Appendix E: Proof for Proposition 5.
In this proposition, I compare optimal total profits between Case F12 (offering free
versions in both platforms) and Case P12 (offering paid versions in both platforms), between
Case F1 (offering free version in only Platform 1) and Case P1 (offering paid version in only
Platform 1), and between Case F2 (offering free version in only Platform 2) and Case P2
(offering paid version in only Platform 2).
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For two-platform strategies, I compare Case F12 against Case P12. Since
𝜋𝐹12 =

1
(𝑏 2 𝑘 2
𝑘2𝛽

− 2𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )) + 𝑠(𝑠(𝜃1 + 𝑟𝜃2 )2 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 + 𝑞0 𝑟𝜃2 −

(1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡))) and 𝜋𝑃12 =

2𝑏2 𝑘−4𝑏𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑞02 𝛽(𝜃12 +𝑟𝜃22 )
,
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)2

𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋𝑃12 = 𝑘 2 (
2𝑘 3 (𝑏−𝑞0 𝛽)2
).
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22

𝛽

− 2𝑘(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 2 𝑡 +

2𝑟𝑠(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)𝜃2
𝛽

+

𝑟 2 𝑠2 𝜃22
𝛽

−

Multiplying with 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 )/𝑘 2 , I calculate −2𝑘 3 𝛽(𝑏 − 𝑞0 𝛽)2 +

(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠𝜃1 − 𝑏𝑘)2 (2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 ) − 2𝑘(1 + 𝑟)𝑠 2 𝑡𝛽(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 ) + 2𝑟𝑠(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 +
𝑠𝜃1 − 𝑏𝑘)𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 ) + 𝑟 2 𝑠 2 𝜃22 (2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃12 − 𝑟𝜃22 ). Note that the coefficient of t is
negative.

Therefore,

to

make

,

𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋𝑃12 > 0

(2𝑘 3 𝛽(𝑏−𝑞0 𝛽)2 −(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 )
−2𝑟𝑠(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 −𝑏𝑘)𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 )+𝑟 2 𝑠2 𝜃22 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 ))
(2𝑘(1+𝑟)𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 −𝑟𝜃22 ))

𝑡<

= φ4

must hold; otherwise, if 𝑡 exceeds this threshold value, then 𝜋𝐹12 − 𝜋𝑃12 < 0. In short, by
checking app users’ disutility sensitivity parameter (𝑡), the developer can decide to offer the app
for either free or paid in both platforms.
Similarly, for single-platform strategies, I compare Case F1 against Case P1. Since
𝜋𝐹1 =

𝑏2 𝑘 2 −4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑠𝜃1 )+4𝑠(𝑠𝜃12 +2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 −𝑠𝑡))
and
4𝑘 2 𝛽

(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2
4𝛽

−

𝑠(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)𝜃1
𝑘𝛽

to 𝑡, I calculate 𝑡 <

+

𝑠2 𝜃12
𝑘2𝛽

−

𝑘(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2
2(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 )

−

2𝑠2 𝑡
.
𝑘

𝜋𝑃1 =

𝑏𝑘(𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+2𝑞02 𝛽𝜃12
4𝑘𝛽−2𝜃12

, 𝜋𝐹1 − 𝜋𝑃1 =

Solving for 𝜋𝐹1 − 𝜋𝑃1 > 0 with respect

𝜃1 (𝜃13 +8𝑘𝑠𝛽𝜃1 (𝑠−𝑞0 𝜃1 )−𝑏2 𝑘 2 𝜃1 −4𝑠2 −
2
4𝑘 𝑞0 𝛽 2 (𝑞0 𝜃1 −4𝑠)+4𝑏𝑘(𝑠𝜃12 +𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃1 −2𝑠)))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃12 )

= φ5 . Therefore, if 𝑡 is smaller

than this threshold value, then 𝜋𝐹1 > 𝜋𝑃1 . Otherwise, 𝜋𝐹1 < 𝜋𝑃1 .
Further,

I

compare

Case

F2

𝑏2 𝑘 2 −4𝑏𝑘(𝑘𝑞0 𝛽+𝑟𝑠𝜃2 )+4𝑟𝑠(𝑟𝑠𝜃22 +2𝑘𝛽(−𝑠𝑡+𝑞0 𝜃2 ))
4𝑘 2 𝛽
(𝑏−2𝑞0 𝛽)2
4𝛽

−

2𝑟𝑠2 𝑡
𝑘

+

𝑟𝑠(2𝑞0 𝛽−𝑏)𝜃2
𝑘𝛽

respect to 𝑡, I calculate 𝑡 <

+

𝑟 2 𝑠2 𝜃22
𝑘2𝛽

and

against
𝜋𝑃2 =

Case

P2.

Since

𝑏𝑘(𝑏−4𝑞0 𝛽)+2𝑞02 𝑟𝛽𝜃22
,
4𝑘𝛽−2𝑟𝜃22

𝑘(𝑏−2𝑞 𝛽)2

0
− 2(2𝑘𝛽−𝑟𝜃
2 ) . Solving for
2

𝜃2 (8𝑘𝑟𝑠𝛽𝜃2 (𝑠−𝑞0 𝜃2 )−𝑏2 𝑘 2 𝜃2 −4𝑟 2 𝜃23
2
−4𝑘 𝑞0 𝛽 2 (𝑞0 𝜃2 −4𝑠)+4𝑏𝑘(𝑟𝑠𝜃22 +𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃2 −2𝑠)))
8𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝑟𝜃22 )

𝜋𝐹2 =

𝜋𝐹2 − 𝜋𝑃2 =

𝜋𝐹2 − 𝜋𝑃2 > 0 with
= φ6 . Therefore, if 𝑡 is

smaller than this threshold value, then 𝜋𝐹2 > 𝜋𝑃2 . Otherwise, 𝜋𝐹2 < 𝜋𝑃2 .
In summary, for two-platform product offering, a free app strategy is more advantageous
than a paid app strategy as long as 𝑡 < φ4 ; for one-platform product offering, a free app strategy
is also more beneficial than a paid app strategy as long as 𝑡 < φ5 (for app offering in Platform
1) or 𝑡 < φ6 (for app offering in Platform 2).
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Abstract
In this article, I consider mobile app developers’ product versioning decisions by focusing on
in-app purchase (IAP). Should a developer provide consumers an app (free or paid) with IAP
option in one platform (e.g., Android or iOS), and how should it design and price the basic app
and IAP? I find that the answer to the former question is “it depends”, although in most
situations offering IAP is a better choice. I also compare forward-looking and myopic strategies
and show that the former always outperforms the latter.
Keywords: App Developer, Mobile App, In-App Purchase (IAP), Product Offering, Pricing
Strategy.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays mobile applications (apps) have become indispensable in our daily digital
lives. App users not only use the initial functionalities or content of the apps (e.g., productivity
apps) but sometimes also utilize additional content or service available in the apps (e.g.,
equipment that empowers a player in a virtual game or extra photo editing feature), which are
so-called “in app purchase (IAP)”2. Apple’s developer website lists several examples of IAP: (1)
a basic versioned app with premium features, (2) a magazine app that allows consumers to buy
and download new issues, and (3) a game app that provides players new levels to explore or
allows them to buy virtual equipment. For example, a free Android video editing app named
PowerDirector allows users to use basic functionalities; however, users will need to pay $0.99
- 5.99 per item if they want to use extra features such as watermarks. Though very new, global
IAP market’s sales revenue is predicted to hit $14 billion in 2015 and will surpass $36 billion
by 2017 (Statista, 2016). The prevalence of IAP can partly be attributed to the fact that an
increase in app price significantly decreases the number of app downloads in the app store
(Casto, 2016). Since users are more sensitive to paid apps than free apps (Yu et al., 2017), IAP
becomes a more effective tool for “converting casual app users into paying customers” as it
allows users to buy additional features after experiencing the benefits of an app (Pettey and van
der Meulen, 2012; Garg and Telang, 2013). A market survey published by Pettey and van der
Meulen (2012) finds that in 2011 only 5% of mobile apps had featured IAP, but that percentage
has increased to 30% in 2016, and IAP sales have increased from 10% to 41% of app store
revenues in the same period.
Due to its novelty, IAP has not drawn much attention from researchers. There appeared
a few empirical papers related to IAP in recent years. Garg and Telang (2013) find that free apps
attract over ten times more volume of downloads than paid apps and IAP brings extra revenue
for app developers. Jung, Baek,& Lee (2012) compare three software app (not mobile app)
offering strategies: free with IAP, limited-time free with paid conversion, and pro-and-lite (paidwith-full-feature and free-with-limited-feature). Ghose and Han (2014) find that apps with IAP
have higher demand relative to those without; in contrast, apps with in-app advertisement choice
have lower demand (download) compared to those without. Yet, analytical research on this topic
is particularly lacking. I am interested in the following question: In what situation should a
mobile app developer offer IAP?
As defined, IAP phenomenon essentially is somehow akin to product upgrade or product
In accordance with Apple, Inc., IAP is referred to as functionalities that include premium
content, virtual products, and subscriptions that require direct payment from consumers.
2
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improvement, which can be viewed as vertical differentiation from the perspective of app
offering. However, upgraded product is completely an extension of the prior versioned product
while IAP can be very different from the initial app functionality. Moreover, in IAP consumers
usually do not wait to make purchase until a new version (i.e., IAP in this case) of an app product
is released. This is different from many prior studies on product upgrade which assume that
consumers can purchase either the earlier or upgraded version of a product (Bala and Carr, 2009).
That being said, app users who buy IAP have to download the basic app first while new
consumers in product upgrade scenario can buy the newer version directly. In addition, in-app
advertisement offers another revenue source for app developers. All of the above features
distinguish IAP from business practices in product upgrade and offerings and so the existing
models of product offering (e.g., Dhebar, 1994; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Bala and Carr, 2009)
cannot be simply applied to the IAP problem.
The objective of this research is to build an analytical framework for app developers’
decision making on product offering facing the IAP option. To achieve this goal, I create a twoperiod model. I consider a monopolistic developer who has an either-or choice between freewith-advertisement and paid app in the first period; the developer determines the quality level
as well as price of the basic versioned app (BA). The developer also considers whether to offer
IAP based on the BA in the second period. If IAP is offered, the developer determines the quality
level and price for the IAP. In the analysis, I am particularly interested in the following questions:
What product offering strategy should an app developer adopt when facing IAP option? Will
IAP strategy always outperform non-IAP strategy? What quality level should the developer set
for both BA and IAP? How much should the developer charge for both BA and IAP?
The present research makes a contribution in three areas. First, it adds to the existing
literature on product offering strategy for information good developers. Prior analytical studies
on product offering strategies from the app developers’ perspective are mostly under-explored
(Yu, et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to create an analytical
model that addresses the IAP decision faced by an app developer. Second, I provide guidance
for practitioners on decisions regarding the choice of whether to offer IAP. We show that strategy
of whether to offer IAP based on BA is dependent on different conditions, although in most
cases offering IAP is a better choice. Moreover, I find that once the choice is determined, the
developer can identify the optimal quality level and prices of the apps (BA and IAP). Finally,
the result derived also suggests app developers to be forward-looking rather than myopic in
deciding their product offering strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature, followed
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by major assumptions and modeling framework in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the problem
based upon our model along with a summary of our findings. Corresponding technical notes of
the analysis are provided in appendices. In Section 5 I conduct analyses of several numerical
examples. The article is concluded with a final discussion and concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Related Literature
In this section I discuss the relevant literature. The current research is mostly related to
those about product offering strategies, particularly product improvement for information goods,
and utility modeling.
Present literature regarding product offering strategies mostly focuses on new product
development (Zirger and Maidique, 1990; Chen et al., 2010, Krishnan and Zhu, 2006), product
improvement and pricing (Kornish, 2001; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1998; Bala and Carr, 2009),
product bundling (Chen, 1997; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999), and multi-platform selection
(Yu et al., 2017). This paper focuses on app offering analysis regarding BA and IAP in the
mobile app market that previous models did not address. Regarding the cost of products offered,
many prior studies treat variable cost as negligible (zero) or linearly increasing with respect to
product quality (e.g., Weber, 2008). Whereas some others adopt nonlinear functions to capture
development cost (e.g., Desai, 2001). Jones and Mendelson (2011) point out that higher power
of the nonlinear function implies higher product development complexity. In a recent research
by Chellappa and Mehra (2017), the authors offer insights of cost drivers that can impact a
developer’s quality and pricing decisions in product versioning. The cost drivers they discuss
include users’ usage costs, versioning costs, and usage cost shifting from users to the developer
due to cloud hosting. Since app products can be duplicated once developed, I assume zero
variable cost (Weber, 2008) and nonlinear product development cost (Desai, 2001) in terms of
quality level.
Research on vertical versioning was introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978). Among
prior studies, product improvement as one type of vertical versioning has also been examined
vastly (e.g., Bhargava and Choudhary, 2008; Anderson and Dana, 2009). In the models for
product improvement and pricing, a major assumption is which period consumers will purchase
the initial product and/or improved version. A rational consumer will self-select the product
version that can maximize her net utility after paying for the “price” (Chellappa and Mehra,
2017). Some studies make a “leapfrogging” assumption that only new users buy the improved
version but existing users would not upgrade the product from the current version they are using
(e.g., Dhebar, 1994; Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Bala and Carr (2009) relax this assumption by
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allowing existing users to buy the upgraded version; additionally, new consumers who have not
bought the current version can buy the new version directly. Given the difference between
upgrade and IAP as explained above, I assume app users have to download BA (free or paid)
first, then consider buying IAP if IAP is available and adds extra utility. Furthermore, Dogan et
al. (2011) examine software developers' decision on how much to upgrade the initial version in
a two-period setting and assume that the demand for the upgraded version is influenced by the
features of the initial version. They find that the amount of a developer's upgrade effort is
impacted by the demand variability. Yu et al. (2017) study app developers’ one-period quality
and pricing decisions for app products in a multi-platform setting. They show that user base is
also a determinant for a developer’s platform selection and pricing decision for its app products.
In this present research I extend Yu et al.’s (2017) model to a two-period but in one-platform
setting in order to focus on IAP’s impact on decisions ; meanwhile, consistent with Dogan et al.
(2011), I assume that the demand for IAP is based on the demand for the BA.
Another set of literature relevant to our research is Hotelling-type utility models. Tracing
back to Hotelling (1929), there have been numerous scholars adopting Hotelling locational
method to determine demand from heterogonous consumers (e.g., Irmen and Thisse, 1998;
Huang et al., 2013; Pun, 2013). Hotelling-type models assume that consumers with
heterogeneous preferences (or tastes) within the marketplace would derive different valuations
to a product with a typical quality and price. Weber’s (2008) circular market model is a special
type of Hotelling utility model that avoids arbitrariness of endpoints existing in the linear
Hotelling market model. In the current paper I also use the circular market model to derive
product demand. The uniqueness and advantages of the circular market model in this paper
include: (1) the user base for IAP is the exact realized demand of BA; and (2) the quality of IAP
level in the second period should be higher than that of BA. In addition, many prior studies
assume that users’ disutility sensitivity to price is constant and normalize it to one (Chambers et
al., 2006). In app industry, consumers might be less sensitive to free apps’ ad-related disutility
than that of paid apps’ price (Yu, et al., 2017). In the current research, I also assume that free
and paid app users have different disutility sensitivities.
3. Model
Assume that a monopolistic app developer considers whether to offer an app with IAP3
functionality in a mobile platform. The developer can offer either free or paid basic versioned
In real world, an app developer can develop many IAPs (each with different features). To keep
the model tractable, I only consider one (non-repetitive purchase) IAP.
3
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app (BA). The free (paid) version can bring in advertisement revenues (app sales revenues) for
the developer. With IAP in consideration, the sales revenue from IAP is another stream of
revenue for the developer. In this paper, I focus only on one platform (e.g., either Android or
iOS platform). The developer determines the quality level of BA (free or paid), denoted by 𝑞
(see Table 1 for parameter notation). The quality is a one-dimensional measure that aggregates
a bundle of attributes typically related to the app’s performance and/or functionality (Weber,
2008; Yu et al., 2017). For example, an online game app’s quality can be related to attributes
such as complexity of the game, user-friendliness, data accuracy, etc. As 𝑞 is constrained by
factors such as the current state of technology and the app itself, I assume there exists an upper
bound of quality (𝑞̂) (e.g., Chambers et al., 2006; Yu et al., 2017). For instance, a calculator is a
simple app for which there exists an upper bound regarding how many functionalities that can
be added to this type of apps.
Table 1. Variable Notation
s
𝜃
𝑘
𝛽
𝑞0
𝑞̂
𝑡
𝑞
𝑞𝑖
𝑝
𝑝𝑖
𝑢
𝑥
𝑚
𝑚𝑖

Parameters
Unit advertisement revenue for a free app
User valuation to an app offered in the platform
User’s unit transportation disutility
Development difficulty parameter of product
Prior quality level that the developer can reuse
Upper limit of quality level 𝑞
App users’ disutility sensitivity parameter for free apps, 0 < 𝑡 < 1
Decision Variables
Initial app’s quality level
IAP’s quality level
Price for the paid version of an initial app
Price of IAP
Other Parameters
Consumer’s net utility
Product's distance from the consumer's ideal point
Realized demand of downloaded app
Realized demand of in-app purchase (IAP)

I assume the app market is a circular space with a size that is normalized to two (Weber,
2008; Yu et al., 2017). In Fig. 1, I expand the market space to a two-dimensional plane. The two
end points on both sides of point 0 are identical if we draw the space in a circular market; and
they are one unit away from point 0. Consumers who locate in this market are heterogeneous
and uniformly distributed in terms of their valuation to app products (𝜃). According to CalvoArmengol and Zenou (2002), the uniform distribution assumption should not change the
qualitative directions of analytical results for my model.
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Let 𝜃𝑞 be a representative user’s valuation where the BA’s quality position perfectly
fits with the user. A user whose location is 𝑥 units from the product’s position will incur some
transportation disutility, 𝑘𝑥 , where 𝑘 denotes unit transportation disutility. Therefore, the
user’s net utility for buying the BA is: 𝑢 = 𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝 − 𝑘𝑥, where 𝑝 denotes the BA’s price when
the developer offers a paid app. In the case when the app is free, the average ad revenue per user
gained by the app developer is 𝑠, which is exogenously determined by the market. In general,
advertisements bring users more annoyance and disutility from advertisement (more electricity
and bandwidth consumption, memory space, effort to turn off ads, etc.). Additionally, it has
been reported that consumers have lower disutility sensitivity to free apps relative to paid apps
(e.g., Chambers et al., 2006; Yu, et al., 2017); hence, I assume the average disutility for free-app
users in using the app is 𝑡𝑠, where 𝑡 (0 < 𝑡 < 1) is users’ disutility sensitivity to ads in free
apps. If the developer offers a free app, then a user’s net utility will be: 𝑢 = 𝜃𝑞 − 𝑡𝑠 − 𝑘𝑥. As
illustrated in Fig. 1, given a price of the app, the higher price or the further the user is away from
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the app product, the less net utility she realizes. Therefore, the farthest users captured by the
developer are those who gain zero net utility. We thus derive the realized demand as
for paid BA (or

2(𝜃𝑞−𝑡𝑠)
𝑘

2(𝜃𝑞−𝑝)
𝑘

for free BA). Note that the BA’s quality (𝑞) is developed based on the

available prior quality (𝑞0 ). The developer can provide net utility of
or 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡 (for free BAs) even if it invests nothing (i.e.,

𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑝 (for paid BAs)

𝑞 = 𝑞0 ) in developing the app

product. I define this net utility as residual utility as below.
Definition 1: Residual Utility (RU), mathematically expressed as 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑝 (for paid apps) or
𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 (for free apps), refers to the net utility gained by a user in using an app product with
such a low quality level that 𝑞 ≅ 𝑞0 with a “price” of 𝑝 (for paid app) or 𝑡𝑠 (for free app).
∎
I assume the app development cost to be 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 (Desai, 2001), which is
nonlinearly increasing function of the quality differential (𝑞 − 𝑞0 ) and 𝛽 is app development
difficulty parameter. Here 𝑞0 represents the skillsets (e.g., Java and/or Objective-C
programming) that the developer has obtained for app development and/or app components that
have been developed by the developer and can be reused (Yu, et al., 2017).
Sometime after the BA launch, the developer captures a group of users. Since IAP
revenues come only from those who download the app, I use a two-period model when IAP
offering is considered. Specifically, the app download (paid or free) occurs in Period 1 and the
purchase of IAP takes place in Period 2. Thus, users who purchase IAP will be only a subset of
those who have used the BA. Let 𝑞𝑖 (𝑞𝑖 > 𝑞) and 𝑝𝑖 denote the IAP’s quality and price,
respectively. The realized demand for the IAP would be
2(𝜃𝑞𝑖 −𝑝𝑖 −𝑡𝑠)
𝑘

2(𝜃𝑞𝑖 −𝑝𝑖 −𝑝)
𝑘

for paid BA case (or

for free BA case). The IAP’s quality must be higher than that of BA for the same

app, hence the development cost of IAP can be expressed as: 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2. I use
a discount factor 𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 < 1) for the sales revenue and development cost of IAP, which
occurs in Period 24. In most situations the discount factor approaches 1 as the time between
download BA and buying IAP is not far apart. As a profit oriented entity, the developer’s
objective is to maximize its total profit. Therefore, the objective function for the profitmaximizing developer who offers IAP in Period 2 can be set up as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).

Though there is no short-cut for periods 1 and 2, the time of buying BA still occurs before that
of buying IAP. Therefore, this 𝛿 represents the discount factor between these two periods.
4
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max {

2𝑝(𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝)
2𝑝𝑖 (𝜃𝑞𝑖 − 𝑝 − 𝑝𝑖 )
+𝛿
} − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2
𝑘
𝑘
− 𝛿{𝛽(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 }

max {

(Paid BA case) (1)

2𝑠(𝜃𝑞 − 𝑡𝑠)
2𝑝𝑖 (𝜃𝑞𝑖 − 𝑡𝑠 − 𝑝𝑖 )
+𝛿
} − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2
𝑘
𝑘
− 𝛿{𝛽(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 }

(Free BA case)(2)

s.t. 𝑞0 < 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝑞̂, 0 < 𝑡 < 1, 0 < 𝛿 < 1, 𝑝, 𝑝𝑖 , 𝛽, 𝑞0 , 𝜃, 𝑠, 𝑘 > 0 .

The component
𝛿

2𝑝𝑖 (𝜃𝑞𝑖 −𝑡𝑠−𝑝𝑖 )
𝑘

2𝑝(𝜃𝑞−𝑝)
+
𝑘

𝛿

2𝑝𝑖 (𝜃𝑞𝑖 −𝑝−𝑝𝑖 )
𝑘

in paid IAP case (or

2𝑠(𝜃𝑞−𝑡𝑠)
𝑘

+

in free IAP case) above represents total revenues, while 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 +

𝛿{𝛽(𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞0 )2 − 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2 } represents total development cost. The decision variables for the
developer include: BA price 𝑝 (if a paid BA is offered), BA quality 𝑞, IAP price 𝑝𝑖 , and IAP
quality 𝑞𝑖 .
If the developer does not offer IAP in the second period, the objective function for the
developer can be expressed as below.
2𝑝(𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝)
− 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2
𝑘
2𝑠(𝜃𝑞 − 𝑡𝑠)
max
− 𝛽(𝑞 − 𝑞0 )2
𝑘
max

(Paid BA only)(3)
(Free BA only)(4)

s.t. 0 < 𝑝 < 1, 𝑞0 < 𝑞 ≤ 𝑞̂, 𝑝, 𝛽, 𝑞0 , 𝜃, 𝑠, 𝑘 > 0.
I construct four cases as follows: (F) free BA only, (P) paid BA only, (FI) free BA + IAP,
and (PI) paid BA + IAP. Note that the developer is a forward-looking decision maker in FI and
PI since all decisions are made in Period 1. However, the developer might be a myopic decision
maker, which means it launches the app without considering IAP offering in Period 1 (cases F
and P). The myopic developer would like to offer IAP in Period 2 if this strategy can generate
extra profit. We therefore have two myopic cases: (FIm) with free BA first then IAP later, and
(PIm) with paid BA first then IAP later. In the analysis section we discuss forward looking cases
in 4.1 and 4.2, and myopic cases in 4.3.
4. Analysis
As mentioned above, I separate our model into four cases (F, P, FI and PI). Both cases
FI and PI have IAP issue but neither case F nor P has IAP issue. Fig. 2 presents the decision tree
faced by the developer. Table 2 displays decision variables in each case. I notice that the
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objective function (i.e., total profit) is quadratic with respect to product quality (𝑞 or 𝑞𝑖 ) and/or
price (𝑝 or 𝑝𝑖 ) in each case. I further check the concavity condition for each case. The result
shows that when strict concavity condition is met, the case might be solvable through the
following procedure: first solve FOCs, and then check whether the solution is feasible (for
example, 𝑞 ∗ or 𝑞𝑖∗ must be no greater than 𝑞̂). In the situation when concavity condition does
not hold or the optimal quality exceeds quality upper bound, the profit is convexly increasing
in quality. Since the objective function is a quadratic form of quality, in these situations the
optimal quality (either 𝑞 ∗ or 𝑞𝑖∗ ) should be 𝑞̂ and 𝑝 and/or 𝑝𝑖 are solved accordingly
afterwards. I call cases in the former situation unbounded cases and those in the latter bounded
cases (𝑞 < 𝑞̂).
Table 2. Decision Variables in Each Case
Forward-looking Cases
F
P
FI
Decision
𝑞, 𝑝
𝑞, 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖
𝑞
Variables

PI
𝑞, 𝑞𝑖 , 𝑝, 𝑝𝑖
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Myopic Cases
FIm
PIm
(𝑞)(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 )
(𝑞, 𝑝) (𝑞𝑖 , 𝑝𝑖 )

Fig. 2. Decision Tree for a Developer’s App Offering Strategy. This figure shows the route
for a developer’s decision making process of app offering. In each node among (1) – (4), there
are offering strategies of free and paid BAs for the developer’s choice, as listed in the following.
Node (1): “free BA only with 𝑞 = 𝑞̂” (bounded case F), “paid BA only with 𝑞 = 𝑞̂” (bounded
case P); Node (2): “free BA only with 𝑞 < 𝑞̂” (unbounded case F), “paid BA only with 𝑞 < 𝑞̂”
(unbounded case P); Node (3): “free BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞̂” (bounded cases FI or FIm), “paid
BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞̂” (bounded cases PI or PIm); Node (4): “free BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖 < 𝑞̂”
(unbounded cases FI or FIm), “paid BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖 < 𝑞̂” (unbounded cases PI or PIm).

Following the above procedure, I first solve each case when the strict concavity
condition holds. Table 3 lists the optimal solutions for three unbounded cases (F, P and FI). The
concavity conditions for each case are presented in Table 4.

Table 3. Optimal Solution Matrix for Unbounded Situation
Case
Price
Quality
Total Profit
(𝑝) or (𝑝,
(𝑞𝑖 ) or (𝑞, 𝑞𝑖 )
𝑝𝑖 )
𝑠𝜃
F
(𝑠, −)
𝑠(𝑠𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡))
(𝑞0 + 𝑘𝛽, −)
𝑘2𝛽
2
𝑘𝑞
𝛽𝜃
2𝑘𝑞
𝛽
0
0
P
𝑞0 𝛽𝜃 2
(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
2 , −)
2 , −)
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2
2
2
2
𝑠𝜃
FI
(𝑠,
𝑠 𝜃
2𝑠 𝑡
2𝑞0 𝑠𝜃
(𝑞0 + 𝑘𝛽−𝑘𝛽𝛿,
2
−
−
𝑞
𝛽𝛿
+
𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡)
0
)
𝑘 2 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)
𝑘
𝑘
2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−𝑠𝑡𝜃
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2
)
2
2
𝛽𝛿(2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽 + 𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡 − 2𝑞0 𝜃))
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
+
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2
PI
No unbounded solution exists in case PI
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Table 4. Concavity and Feasibility Condition for Cases F, P, FI and PI
2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽𝜃
𝜃2
F
𝑠<
if 𝛽 >
2𝑘𝑡𝛽−𝜃2

P
FI

𝜃2

𝛽 > 2𝑘 & 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 >

2𝑠𝑘𝛽+𝜃2
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

2𝑘𝑡

𝜃2
𝛽>
2𝑘
𝑠𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )
𝜃2
& {𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 < 𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 ) if 𝛽 < 𝑘 }

PI

NA
When the condition for strict concavity is not met, I use an indirect method to solve the

model by following Petruzzi and Dada (1999). I find that, at any given quality level, the
objective function is always strictly concave in price decisions, and case F is always strictly
𝜃2

𝜃2

concave but case P is strictly concave only when 𝛽 > 2𝑘. When 𝛽 < 2𝑘, the objective function
of case P is convex in quality 𝑞; in this situation, the developer should set 𝑞 = 𝑞̂ and thus the
optimal 𝑝 can be solved accordingly. If the developer sets 𝑞 = 𝑞̂ in Period 1, since the quality
upper bound is reached, IAP option will not be considered and case PI would not exist. In case
FI, when 𝛽 <

𝜃2
2𝑘

, the objective function is not strictly concave (bounded situation). In that

situation, I solve the profit maximization problem by setting 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞̂ and then solve 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞
accordingly as 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞 are strictly concave at any 𝑞𝑖 . I find that, in case PI, interior optimal
𝜃2

solution (𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂) exists when 𝛽 > 2𝑘; but in case PI, the quality of IAP should be set at its
quality upper bound (𝑞̂) because the optimal solution for case PI obtained by solving FOCs is
not feasible due to 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞 ∗ when case PI’s strict concavity condition holds. This implies that
only the bounded solution (𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) should be considered for case PI. Thus I propose Lemma 1
below.
Table 5. Optimal Solution Matrix for Bounded Situation
Case
F

Price
(𝒑) or (𝒑,𝒑𝒊)
(𝑠, −)

P

( , −)

Quality
(𝒒) or (𝒒, 𝒒𝒊)
(𝑞̂, −)

𝑞̂𝜃

Total Profit
2𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡)
− 𝛽(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2
𝑘
𝑞̂2 𝜃 2
− 𝛽(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2
2𝑘

(𝑞̂, −)

2

FI

PI

(𝑠,

(

1
2

(𝑞̂𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡))

𝑘𝛽𝜃(1−𝛿)(2𝑞0 −𝑞̂𝛿)

,

𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃2
𝑘𝛽𝜃(1−𝛿)(2𝑞̂−𝑞0 )−𝑞̂𝜃3
𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃2

(𝑞0 +

(

𝑠𝜃
𝑘𝛽−𝑘𝛽𝛿

2𝑠 2 𝜃 2 − 2𝑘 2 (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1 − 𝛿)𝛿 +
𝑘𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃 2 − 𝑠 2 𝑡(4 − 𝑡𝛿) + 𝑠(4𝑞0 𝜃 − 2𝑞̂𝑡𝛿𝜃))
2𝑘 2 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)
2𝑘𝛽(𝑞02 − 𝑞0 𝑞̂(3 − 𝛿)𝛿 + 𝑞̂2 (2 − 𝛿)𝛿)𝜃 2
−𝑘 2 (𝑞0 − 𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (4 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝛿)𝛿 − 𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃 4
𝑘(𝑘𝛽(4 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝛿) − 2𝜃 2 )

,𝑞̂)

𝑘𝑞0 𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−𝑞̂𝛿𝜃2
𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃2

, 𝑞̂)

)

Lemma 1. In the "paid BA + IAP" strategy (PI), offering IAP with a quality lower than the
upper bound (𝑞̂) is never optimal. ∎
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Lemma 1 offers an analytical explanation for the phenomenon that many paid apps
with IAP option are well designed. In reality, paid app users have higher willingness-to-pay
(WTP, denoted by 𝜃) than those who prefer download for free. As a result, the optimal strategy
in offering “paid BA + IAP” should be designing BA at a medium quality but IAP at a maximum
quality. The BA quality is medium so that it can attract more users to pay BA in the first period.
Since not all users need to use all features at a high app quality, having a too high BA quality
will significantly decrease its user base given the price of BA (𝑝∗ ) will be high too. I found such
paid apps with IAP offerings especially in productivity, photo and video categories. For example,
Photo Lab PRO HD is a full-feature photo editor priced at $4.99 on iOS App store; its IAP
options like Old Movie Film Effect and Oil Paint Brush Texture costs $15 or above; Receipt
Scanner 2 on iOS is priced at $3.99, but its IAP providing device-to-device synchronization is
$4.99. With such a high price, the additional features in the IAP must be well designed for
specific app users.
As shown in Fig. 2, for a developer, in Period 1 it decides either free or paid version
for launching a BA; meanwhile it can choose to (1) set the BA with a quality level of upper
bound which disallows the developer to offer IAP technically, or (2) set it lower than upper
bound so that there is a room for offering IAP in Period 2. This is applicable for both forwardlooking and myopic developers.
According to the decision tree in Fig. 2, I find it too intricate to identify the global app
offering strategy if all decision points of (1) - (4) are considered at the same time. For tractability
purpose, I make a further assumption. That is, the developer has decided to launch either free or
paid BA with consideration for developing IAP in the later period (i.e., setting the BA’s quality
𝑞 < 𝑞̂). Thus, the developer only needs to consider decision nodes of (2), (3) and (4). In the
following subsections, I discuss app offering decisions for a forward-looking developer first.
The major findings are summarized in 4.1. I then discuss decisions for a myopic developer’s
IAP offering by summarizing the major findings in 4.2. Finally, I compare forward-looking and
myopic strategies and summarize the findings in 4.3. Proofs for all propositions are provided in
Appendices A through F.
4.1 Forward-Looking Strategies for App Offering
A forward-looking developer will simultaneously consider decision choices in both
periods. Since it has already chosen either free or paid version for launching the BA, it needs to
compare strategies of “BA only” and “BA + IAP” for the situation of either version. Specifically,
for free BA offering, the following decision choices are considered: unbounded case F (free BA
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only with 𝑞 < 𝑞̂), unbounded case FI (free BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂), and bounded case FI (free
BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂); while for paid BA offering, the following strategies are considered:
unbounded case P (paid BA only with 𝑞 < 𝑞̂), and bounded case PI (paid BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖∗ =
𝑞̂)5.
4.1.1

Free BA Plus IAP
Since the developer is profit oriented, I compare the total profit gained by the developer

in different offering strategies. I find that for a developer adopting free BA strategy and offering
IAP in the later period, the decision on whether to offer IAP depends on how challenging the
IAP component to be developed (𝛽) is and whether the IAP’s quality (𝑞𝑖 ) has reached the quality
upper bound 𝑞̂. I summarize my findings regarding free strategies for “BA + IAP” offering in
Proposition 1(a) and (b) for the situation when the developer leaves room to offer IAP in the
later period, and Proposition 2 for the situation when the developer leaves no room for future
IAP offering.
𝜃2

Proposition 1. (a) When the IAP is challenging to develop (i.e., 𝛽 > 2𝑘), offering IAP on top
of free BA (unbounded case FI), if feasible (see Table 4), is always better off than not offering
IAP (unbounded case F) as long as the optimal quality of IAP is lower than quality upper limit
(𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂). (b) When the optimal quality of IAP has to be set at its upper limit (𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂), then as
long as the feasibility condition holds (see Table 6), offering IAP on top of free BA (bounded
case FI) outperforms the strategy that does not offer IAP (unbounded case F) when time discount
factor (𝛿) is so large that 𝛿 >

2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −2𝑠2 𝜃2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2
.
2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2

∎

Proposition 1(a) implies that in the situation when the app is not easy to develop but
there is room for designing IAP on top of the launched BA, the developer should always provide
the IAP as long as it is feasible to do that. The feasibility conditions for the unbounded case FI
are: 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 >

2𝑠𝑘𝛽+𝜃2
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

𝑠𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

and 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 < 𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 ) (if 𝛽 >

𝜃2
)
𝑘

(see Table 4). Note

that “𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠” is defined as residual utility (RU; see Definition 1). Hence, when the IAP is not
𝜃2

easy to develop (i.e., 𝛽 > 2𝑘) as well as the developer is able to provide high enough RU (i.e.,
RU >

2𝑠𝑘𝛽+𝜃2
), offering IAP is
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

a better option than not offering IAP. However, if the IAP is too

challenging to develop (i.e., 𝛽 >

𝜃2
),
𝑘

offering IAP can only be feasible when RU is not too

5

Since unbounded solution for PI does not exist (as discussed in Lemma 1), there are only two
cases for comparison in paid BA situation.
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𝑠𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

high (i.e., RU < 𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )). This makes sense since higher difficulty of IAP development
(larger 𝛽) requires “charging” users more (larger 𝑠) for cost compensation, thereby lowering
RU. Even though the average ad revenue per user (𝑠) is predetermined by the market, the
developer would not offer IAP if the average ad revenue per user is too low. This finding may
explain why many mobile apps with IAP options (e.g., PowerDirector) are free even though
those apps seem not easy to design.
In addition, my finding as summarized in Proposition 1(b) suggests that the developer
should exploit the quality upper bound through offering IAP if the app is easy to develop (i.e.,
𝛽<

𝜃2
) and time discount factor is large (i.e.,
2𝑘

𝛿>

2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −2𝑠2 𝜃2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2
). Larger time
2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2

discount factor implies shorter time interval between BA and IAP offerings. Proposition 1(b)
accords with the intuition because longer time interval between the two periods would require
higher profitability for investing in the later period (offering IAP in Period 2 in this setting);
Hence, offering IAP is preferable when time discount factor is large. Of course, the developer
should adopt the strategy of offering IAP depending on whether it is feasible to do that (see
feasibility condition in Table 6). In fact, I observe that some simple apps are free with IAP
options (e.g., 7 Minute Workout).
Proposition 2. For free BA situation, offering “BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂ (bounded case FI), as
long as feasible, is more profitable than offering “BA only” with 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂ (bounded case F). ∎
For a developer adopting free BA strategies, there are two options for exploiting the
quality upper bound (as Fig. 2 illustrates): launching “BA only” with 𝑞 = 𝑞̂ (bounded case F)
without any choice of offering IAP, and offering “BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂ (bounded case FI).
I show that exploiting the quality upper bound in two periods (bounded case FI), as long as
feasible, is always more profitable than doing this in only one period (bounded case F). The
result suggests that embedding IAP option is a better choice if the developer wants to provide
users all possible functions/features (i.e., product with quality upper bound). Here is the
explanation. For an app with high quality, it is possible for a developer to “charge” users a high
“price”. Since “free BA + IAP” strategy offers a pricing tool while the average ad revenue per
user in “free BA only” offering is determined by the market, “free BA + IAP” is a better choice.
In reality, I observe that many high-quality free apps are offered with IAP option rather than
without IAP option. For instance, apps such as high-end movie editing tools (e.g.,
PowerDirector) and complex games (e.g., Pokemon Go) are provided for free. However, these
apps are all featured with IAP.
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4.1.2

Paid BA Plus IAP
As discussed previously in Lemma 1, the strategy that launches IAP on top of paid BA

without setting the IAP’s quality at the upper limit is always suboptimal. Further, the analytical
result shows that the condition under which either “paid BA only” or “paid BA + IAP” is too
complicated. This is not surprising since in bounded cases the dominance relationship depends
on the level of quality upper bound. Due to the uninterpretable result, I do not discuss the details
in this paper.
So far in this section, I assume the developer is a forward-looking decision maker. In
some situations a developer may not consider the decision for Period 2 when it sets a strategy
for app offering in Period 1. I summarize my major findings related to myopic app offering
strategies in Section 4.2.
4.2 App Offering Strategies for Myopic Decisions
For a developer who is myopic in app offering decisions and does not plan to provide
IAP in the later period, it can choose to offer the BA with quality level of the upper limit (𝑞̂) or
lower than the upper limit. If optimal level of BA’s quality can be set as lower than 𝑞̂, I show
𝑠𝜃

that the optimal qualities are 𝑞0 + 𝑘𝛽 for “free BA only” strategy and

2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

for “paid BA

only” strategy, respectively. A myopic developer will also offer IAP in Period 2 if it can gain
some extra revenues by doing this. The results show that it is infeasible for a myopic developer
to offer IAP in Period 2 without setting the IAP quality at the upper limit; and, for any feasible
situation of IAP offering the developer should set the price and quality of the IAP as listed in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. For a myopic developer, if feasible

6

6

, it should set (𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 ) as

Feasibility conditions:

Unbounded Case FIm:
𝑘𝛽
𝑚𝑖𝑛{1,
𝑘𝛽−𝜃2
2

−1+

𝑞0 𝜃
𝑠

+

𝜃2

𝛽 > 2𝑘
𝜃2
}
𝑘𝛽

&

𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 > 0

if 𝜃 2 < 𝑘𝛽 } &

&

𝑘𝑞 𝛽𝜃

0
𝑠 < 𝑘(2+𝑡)𝛽−𝜃
2

𝑘𝛽
{𝑚𝑎𝑥{0,
𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

−1+

𝑞0 𝜃
𝑠

+

&

{0 < 𝑡 <

𝜃2
}
𝑘𝛽

< 𝑡 < 1 if

𝑘𝛽 < 𝜃 < 2𝑘𝛽 };
Bounded Case FIm: 𝑠 <

𝑘(2𝑞0 −𝑞̂)𝛽𝜃
𝑘𝑡𝛽−2𝜃2

& {0 < 𝑡 <

𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝜃−√2𝑘 3 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝑠2 𝛽 3 −2𝑘𝑠4 𝛽𝜃2
𝑘𝑠2 𝛽

𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝜃−√2𝑘 3 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝑠2 𝛽 3 −2𝑘𝑠4 𝛽𝜃2
𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝜃+√2𝑘 3 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝑠2 𝛽 3 −2𝑘𝑠4 𝛽𝜃2
<
1}
or
{
2
𝑘𝑠 𝛽
𝑘𝑠2 𝛽
3
2
2
3
4
2
𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝜃−√2𝑘 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂) 𝑠 𝛽 −2𝑘𝑠 𝛽𝜃

1 if

𝑘𝑠2 𝛽

< 1}

Bounded Case PIm:
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<𝑡<

if 0 <

𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡) 2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−𝑠𝑡𝜃
,
)
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

(

1
2

in unbounded “free BA + IAP” case (or ( (𝑞̂𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡), 𝑞̂) in bounded
1

𝑘𝑞 𝛽

0
“free BA + IAP” case), and (𝑝𝑖 , 𝑞𝑖 ) as (2 𝜃(𝑞̂ − 2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
̂) in “paid BA + IAP” case. ∎
2 ), 𝑞

Proposition 3 provides a guideline of IAP pricing and quality setting for developers
who in Period 1 did not consider the choice of offering IAP at all. Specifically, it is possible for
a myopic developer to gain extra revenues via offering IAP in both unbounded and bounded
“free BA + IAP” cases; whereas in “paid BA + IAP” cases, the only way to achieve optimality
is to set the IAP quality at the upper limit (𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂). The implication is that if the app developer
has not thought of IAP offering when launching a paid app, then it will be infeasible for the
developer to offer IAP in the later period unless the market condition changes (i.e., some model
parameters have evolved). Over time, the state of technology will advance, thereby making
offering new features of the app product possible. For example, due to the development for the
features of time lapse and image stabilization, consumers are willing to pay more for photo
editors if such features are available as IAP. In this case, users’ WTP (𝜃) actually increases
alongside the increase of quality upper limit (𝑞̂). The change of market condition is beyond my
model assumption. Given the results for myopic cases are similar to those for forward-looking
cases, I do not discuss the interpretations of Proposition 3 extensively for brevity.
However, I am interested in which one is superior between forward-looking and myopic
strategies. To investigate this, I separately compare case FI (forward-looking offering of “free
BA + IAP”) against case FIm (myopic offering of “free BA and then IAP”), and case PI
(forward-looking offering of “paid BA + IAP”) against case PIm (myopic offering of “paid BA
and then IAP”). I summarize my findings based on the comparison results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. For a developer who offers IAP, forward-looking strategy always outperforms
myopic strategy no matter whether the developer launches the BA for free or paid.

∎

Proposition 4 suggests that forward-looking decisions are always better off compared to
those that are myopic. Note that for “paid BA + IAP” offerings, the myopic strategy is infeasible.
In fact, even if the myopic strategy is feasible, it is inferior against forward-looking strategy as
long as the feasibility condition for forward-looking strategy holds. This finding is intuitive

max{

𝑘𝑞0 𝛽(4𝑘𝛽 − 3𝜃 2 )(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 ) − √2√𝑘 3 𝑞02 𝛽3 𝜃 2 (−2𝑘𝛽 + 𝜃 2 )2 𝑘𝑞0 𝛽
,
, 𝑞 } < 𝑞̂
(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 )3
2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 0
𝑘𝑞0 𝛽(4𝑘𝛽 − 3𝜃 2 )(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 ) + √2√𝑘 3 𝑞02 𝛽3 𝜃 2 (−2𝑘𝛽 + 𝜃 2 )2
<
(2𝑘𝛽 − 𝜃 2 )3
52

since making decision by simultaneously considering future periods should be a better approach
than that by focusing only on current period decision. The findings suggest that a developer
should follow a forward-looking strategy when making decisions for its app offering; however,
as discussed in Proposition 3, if it does not take future decisions into consideration in the early
period, offering IAP should still be considered in the later period as long as feasible and
profitable. I notice that indeed some app developers are myopic in setting quality and price for
its app product. Take 7 Minute Workout for instance, the developer did some tests by charging
users some pennies at the very beginning; it then offered the app for free without considering
what to do next. However, some days later the developer realized it should include IAP options
(Hall, 2015).
5. Numerical Analysis
In this section I conduct numerical examples to investigate the dynamics of IAP
offering problems. In mobile app industry, I simply set 𝑠 = $10, 𝜃 = $8, 𝛿 = 0.8, 𝑡 = 0.7,
𝑘 = 5, and 𝑞0 = 11, respectively. I examine how app development difficulty (𝛽) and quality
upper limit (𝑞̂) impact the dominance of offering or not offering IAP on top of a free BA in this
setting. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the strategy dominance. As shown, when both app
development difficulty (𝛽) and quality upper limit (𝑞̂) are large, case FI (offering IAP based on
free BA) is dominant. Note that given the values that I have set for the other parameters, the
concavity condition for case FI (i.e., 𝛽 >

𝜃2
)
2𝑘

is satisfied when 𝛽 exceeds 6.4. According to

Proposition 1 (a), when case FI is concave, this strategy is more profitable than that in case F if
case FI is (1) feasible (i.e., 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 >

2𝑠𝑘𝛽+𝜃2
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

𝑠𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

and 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 < 𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 ) (if 𝛽 <

𝜃2
))
𝑘

as well as (2) quality upper limit (𝑞̂) is high such that 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂. In this value setting, 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 >
2𝑠𝑘𝛽+𝜃2
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

always holds; however, in the region where 𝛽 is smaller than 12.8, 𝛽 <

𝜃2
𝑘

happens.

𝑠𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

In this scenario, case FI would be infeasible if 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 > 𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 ) . Therefore, the
developer should either offer IAP with maximum quality level on top of a launched BA
(bounded case FI) or not offering IAP at all (case F), depending on the condition faced by the
developer. That is why we see that in some area bounded case FI or case F are dominant even
though 𝛽 > 12.8.
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Figure 3. Dominant Strategies and Favorite Conditions for Free App Offering. This figure
illustrates the dominance relationship between case F (“free BA only”) and case FI (“free app +
IAP”) along with changing values of app development difficulty (𝛽) and quality upper limit (𝑞̂).
I set 𝑠 = $10, 𝜃 = $8, 𝛿 = 0.8, 𝑡 = 0.7, 𝑘 = 5, and 𝑞0 = 11, respectively. FIB represents
FI 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂.

𝜃2

In fact, when 𝛽 < 6.4 (i.e., 𝛽 < 2𝑘), case FI is non-concave anymore, indicating the
quality upper bound is the optimal level for the IAP’s quality (i.e., 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂). In this situation,
bounded case FI (offering IAP on top of free BA with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) can be dominant only when
conditions of 𝛿 >

2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −2𝑠2 𝜃2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2
2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2

and bounded case FI’s feasibility are

simultaneously met. Note that bounded case FI’s feasibility condition is more constrained (see
Table 6). As a consequence, there is only a small region where the bounded case FI is dominant.
Nevertheless, bounded case FI is favorable only when the same conditions, i.e., 𝛿 >
2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 −2𝑠2 𝜃2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2
2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽2 −𝑘𝛽(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑡𝑠)2

and bounded case FI’s feasibility condition, are simultaneously

satisfied. The above results are consistent with Proposition 2 (b).
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Table 6. Feasibility Condition for Bounded Cases F, P, FI and PI
F

2𝑠 2 (𝑞̂𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠)
𝑘(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2
𝑞̂2 𝜃 2
𝛽<
2𝑘(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2

𝛽<

P
FI

−

𝑠𝜃 2
𝑘𝛽−𝑘𝛽𝛿

< 𝑞0 𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠 < (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )𝜃 −
𝑞̂𝜃

min{

𝑠

,

1
𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿

2𝑠𝜃 2

𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)

& 𝑠<

𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )
𝜃

& 𝑡<

(𝑘𝑠𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(2𝑠 + 𝑞̂𝛿𝜃) −

√2√𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑘 2 (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽2 (1 − 𝛿)𝛿 2 − 𝑠 2 𝛿𝜃 2 − 2𝑘𝑠𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑠 + (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )𝛿𝜃)) )}
1
𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿

(or 𝑡 >

(𝑘𝑠𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(2𝑠 + 𝑞̂𝛿𝜃) +

√2√𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑘 2 (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽2 (1 − 𝛿)𝛿 2 − 𝑠 2 𝛿𝜃 2 − 2𝑘𝑠𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑠 + (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )𝛿𝜃))) ) (if
𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑘 2 (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽2 (1 − 𝛿)𝛿 2 − 𝑠 2 𝛿𝜃 2 − 2𝑘𝑠𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑠 + (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )𝛿𝜃)) > 0)
PI

𝑘>

2𝜃 2
𝛽(4−5𝛿+𝛿 2 )

𝛿𝑞̂ 𝑘𝑞̂𝛽𝛿(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−(3−𝛿)𝜃 2 )−√𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 (𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃 2 )(2𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)−𝜃 2 )
,
}
2
𝑘𝛽(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)𝛿−2𝜃 2 )
𝑞̂𝜃 2
𝑘𝑞̂𝛽𝛿(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−(3−𝛿)𝜃 2 )+√𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 (𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃 2 )(2𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)−𝜃 2 )
,
}
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)
𝑘𝛽(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)𝛿−2𝜃 2 )

& max{

𝑞0 < min{2𝑞̂ −

<

In the second example, I investigate the scenario when quality upper bound is reached
in free app offering. As mentioned previously, there are two cases for this scenario: bounded
case F (“free BA only” with 𝑞 = 𝑞̂) and bounded case FI (“free BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞̂). To
generate some data, I set 𝑠 = $10 , 𝜃 = $8 , 𝛿 = 0.8 , 𝛽 = 8 , 𝑘 = 5 , and 𝑞̂ = 100 ,
respectively, allowing the values of the time discount factor (𝑡) and prior quality (𝑞0 ) to be
varying. Under this value setting, I compare the two cases in terms of optimal total profit. Fig.
4 demonstrates the dominance relationship between the two cases. As observed, when prior
quality (𝑞0 ) is smaller than 90, the bounded case FI is dominant. When prior quality (𝑞0 ) exceeds
90, bounded case FI becomes infeasible and while bounded case F is still feasible; hence, the
bounded case F is dominant.
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Fig. 4. Dominance Relationship between Bounded Cases F & FI. This figure illustrates the
dominance relationship between bounded case F (“free BA only” with 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂) and case FI
(“free app + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) along with changing values of time discount factor (𝑡) and prior
quality (𝑞0 ). I set 𝑠 = $10, 𝜃 = $8, 𝛿 = 0.8, 𝛽 = 8, 𝑘 = 5, and 𝑞̂ = 100, respectively. FB
and FIB represent bounded cases F and FI, respectively.

6. Conclusion
In this research, I investigate mobile application (app) developers’ decisions on whether
to offer in app purchase (IAP) on top of a launched app with either a free or paid version. I build
a two-period model which considers several characteristics of the app market: app users’
willingness-to-pay, different users’ disutility sensitivities to free and paid apps, app quality,
average ad revenue per user, time discount factor, and potential app quality upper bound. This
paper mainly contributes in that it enriches the literature of information good versioning in the
context of IAP, a topic that has not been well addressed by analytical studies. The several
insights derived from our analytical and numerical analyses have their managerial implications.
First, I find that in the free app scenario, when the app is not easy to develop, then as
long as the IAP’s quality is lower than the quality upper bound, launching IAP on top this basic
app is a better choice. Due to the high difficulty level of app development, offering the IAP will
require a relatively small investment when the IAP does not need to be designed with an overall
quality that has exploited the quality upper limit. In this situation, launching IAP is always
preferable. The IAP development will require a relatively large investment if the developer
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wants to provide a well-designed IAP such that the quality reaches the upper limit. In this
situation, offering IAP on top of this basic app is not absolutely preferable. In fact, the developer
can also exploit the quality upper bound when launching the basic versioned app at the very
beginning. However, I show that this strategy is always inferior compared to the strategy that
offers IAP with a quality of the upper limit on top of a basic app.
Second, I find that in the paid app scenario offering IAP based on the basic app is
better off only under some complicated conditions. This is consistent with our intuition because
a developer can actually utilize the pricing tool to achieve its profitability objective when
launching the basic app at the very beginning. In general, users paying for the app out of their
pocket require high-quality of the app. Therefore, a developer adopting a “paid” strategy should
provide the market with a well-designed app product (e.g., offering as many
features/functionalities as possible). Indeed, our analytical result shows that offering IAP with
a quality lower than the quality upper limit on top of a paid versioned app is never optimal. Due
to the “high-quality” requirement, the choice of offering IAP based on a paid app has a concern
of high product development cost; hence, more conditions must be examined if a profitmaximizing firm considers launching IAP on top a paid app.
Last, I show that in app offering facing IAP option, a forward-looking decision is
always preferable than a myopic decision under the same scenario. In practice, an app developer
might be either forward-looking or myopic. For such developers who did not foresee IAP when
offering its basic app, it is also possible to gain some extra revenues through adding IAP features
under certain condition in the later period. However, this is not the better choice; conversely, if
a developer takes into consideration of IAP option when launching the basic app, it should be
able to gain more total revenue than just focusing on the current period in decision making.
This paper has several limitations which point to some potential directions for future
research. First, for tractability I assume that a developer has decided on launching an app for
either paid or free when considering whether to feature the app with IAP option. In practice, a
developer can also offer a basic app with both paid and free versions at the same time and set
relatively high quality for the paid version. Future research may relax this assumption so that
the model is more generalizable. Second, in this article I consider the scenario that there is only
one IAP option for a developer. In reality, the developer may offer a menu of IAP options. This
typically is versioning the IAP component in order to capture more IAP users. Future studies
that consider this situation should be quite interesting. Third, I assume the quality upper limit is
unchanged within the planning horizon in this research. Extended models that allows evolving
quality upper limit are encouraged in the future. Finally, this research does not consider the
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competition among app developers. Future research could also consider extending our research
by addressing this issue.

58

References
Anderson, E., & Dana, J. (2009). When is price discrimination profitable? Management Science,
55(6), 980-989.
Bakos, Y., & Brynjolfsson, E. (1999). Bundling information goods: pricing, profits and
efficiency. Management Science, 45(12), 1613-1630.
Bala, R., & Carr, S. (2009). Pricing software upgrades: The role of product improvement and
user costs. Production and Operations Management, 18(5), 560-580.
Bhargave, H., & Choudhary, V. (2008). Research note: When is versioning optimal for
information goods? Management Science, 54(5), 1029-1035.
Bhattacharya, S., Krishnan, S., & Mahajan, V. (2003). Operationalizing technology
improvements in product development decision-making. European Journal of Operational
Research, 149(1), 102-130.
Calvo-Armengol, A., & Zenou, Y. (2002). The importance of the distribution of consumers in
horizontal product differentiation. Journal of Regional Science, 42(4), 793-803.
Casto, S. (2016). Free Apps vs. Paid Apps: What Brings in the Biggest Profit? Available:
http://www.preapps.com/blog/free-apps-vs-paid-apps-what-brings-in-the-biggest-profit,
Accessed on Aug 24, 2016.
Chambers, C., Kouvelis, P., & Semple, J. (2006). Quality-based competition, profitability, and
variable costs. Management Science, 52(12), 1884-1895.
Chellappa, R.K., & Mehra, A. (2017). Cost drivers of versioning: Pricing and product line
strategies for information goods. Management Science, Articles in Advance, 1–17
Chen, Y. (1997). Equilibrium product bundling. The Journal of Business, 70(1), 85-103.
Chen, Y., Carrillo, J.E., Vakharia, A.J., & Sin, P. (2010). Fusion product planning: A market
offering perspective. Decision Sciences, 41(2), 325-353.
Desai, P. S. (2001). Quality segmentation in spatial markets: When does cannibalization affect
product line design? Marketing Science, 20 (3), 265-283.
Dhebar, A. (1994). Durable-goods monopolists, rational consumers, and improving products.
Marketing Science, 13(1), 100-120.
Dogan, K., Ji, Y., Mookerjee, V.S., & Radhakrishnan, S. (2011). Managing the versions of a
software product under variable and endogenous demand. Information Systems Research,
22(1), 5-21.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1998). Upgrades, trade-ins, and buybacks. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 29(2), 235-258.
Garg, R., Telang, R. (2013). Inferring app demand from publicly available data. MIS Quarterly,
59

37(4), 1253-1264.
Ghose, A., & Han, S. P. (2014). Estimating demand for mobile applications in the new economy.
Management Science, 60(6), 1470-1488.
Hall, S. (2015). How I got 2.3 million app downloads (without spending a cent on marketing).
Available at https://stories.appbot.co/how-i-got-2-3m-app-downloads-without-spending-acent-on-marketing-f4823b6bc779#.jc3hjxj5i, Accessed on March 9, 2017.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal, 39(153), 41-57.
Huang, J., Leng, M., & Parlar, M. (2013). Demand Functions in Decision Modeling: A
Comprehensive Survey and Research Directions. Decision Sciences, 44(3), 557-609.
Jones, R., & Mendelson, H. (2011). Information goods vs. industrial goods: Cost structure and
competition. Management Science, 57(1), 164-176.
Jung, E. Y., Baek, C, & Lee, J.D. (2012). Product survival analysis for the app Store. Marketing
Letter, 23(4), 929–941.
Kornish, L. (2001). Pricing for a durable goods monopolist under rapid sequential innovation.
Management Science, 47(11), 1552-1561.
Krishnan, V., & Zhu, W. (2006). Designing a family of development-intensive products.
Management Science, 52(6), 813-825.
Lau, A.H.L, & Lau, H.S. (2003). Effects of demand-curve’s shape on the optimal solutions of a
multi-echelon inventory/pricing model. European Journal of Operational Research, 147(3),
530-548.
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory,
18(2), 301-317.
Petruzzi, N.C., & Dada, M. (1999). Pricing and the newsvendor problem: A review with
extensions. Operations Research, 47(2), 183-194.
Pettey, C., & van der Meulen, R. (2012). Gartner says free apps will account for nearly 90 per
cent

of

total

mobile

app

store

downloads

in

2012.

Available

http://www.pressebox.com/attachment/510768/2012Mobile+App+Store+ForecastSeptember+11+EMEA.pdf, Accessed on Aug 24, 2016.
Pun, H. (2013). Channel structure design for complementary products under a co-opetitive
environment. Decision Sciences, 44(4), 785-796.
Rosen, S. (1974). Hedonic prices and implicit markets: Product differentiation in pure
competition. Journal of Political Economy, 82(1), 34-55.
Statista (2016). Total worldwide in-app purchase revenues from 2011 to 2017 (in million U.S.
dollars).

Accessed

August

16,
60

2016,

available

at

http://www.statista.com/statistics/220186/total-global-in-app-revenue-forecast/.
Iber, T. A. (2008). Delayed multiattribute product differentiation. Decision Support Systems, 44,
447-468.
Williams, T. (2016). How Pokemon Go makes money? MarketWatch, July 12, accessed August
16, 2016, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-pokemon-go-makes-money2016-07-11.
Yu, D., Chen, Y., & Ni, J. (2017). Application developers’ product offering strategies in multiplatform markets. Working paper.
Zirger, B. J., & Maidique, M. (1990). A model of new product development: An empirical test.
Management Science, 36(7), 867-883.

61

Appendices
Appendix A. Proof for Lemma 1.
The objective function (total profit) in case PI includes decision variables: qualities of BA and
IAP (𝑞 and 𝑞𝑖 ), and prices of BA and IAP (𝑝 and 𝑝𝑖 ). The objective function is always
concave in prices; whereas it can be either concave or convex in qualities. The optimal quality
that is loIr than upper limit can only occur in the situation of concavity. Assuming the objective
function is concave, I obtain the optimal qualities of the initial app and IAP as follows:
𝑘𝑞 𝛽(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−(2−𝛿)𝜃2 )

𝑘𝑞 𝛽(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−(3−𝛿)𝜃2 )

𝑞 ∗ = 𝑘 2 𝛽20(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝑘𝛽(2−𝛿)𝜃2 +𝜃4, and 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑘 2 𝛽20(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝑘𝛽(2−𝛿)𝜃2 +𝜃4.
𝑘𝑞 𝛽𝜃2

0
I further check that 𝑞𝑖∗ − 𝑞 ∗ = − 𝑘 2 𝛽2 (4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝑘𝛽(2−𝛿)𝜃
2 +𝜃4 . Note that when

concavity condition holds, 𝑘 2 𝛽 2 (4 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝛿) − 2𝑘𝛽(2 − 𝛿)𝜃 2 + 𝜃 4 > 0 (4th principal
minor must be positive). Hence 𝑞𝑖∗ − 𝑞 ∗ < 0. However, this is infeasible since the quality of
IAP should be higher than that of BA. Therefore, the optimal quality that is lower than upper
limit can never happen. In other words, the optimal quality of IAP can only be bounded to the
upper limit (i.e., 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂).
In summary, in case PI (“paid app + IAP”), offering the IAP with a quality lower than
the upper limit is never optimal.
Appendix B. Proof for Proposition 1.
Denote 𝜋𝑖 (𝜋̅𝑖 ) as the optimal total profit for unbounded (bounded) case 𝑖. I use the same
notations throughout the proofs for all of the propositions.
Proof for Proposition 1(a):
𝜃2

When product development difficulty (𝛽) for the IAP is such high that 𝛽 > 2𝑘, the objective
function for case FI (“free app + IAP” strategy) is strictly concave. Given the optimal quality of
IAP solved is lower than the upper limit (𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂), I obtain the optimal total profit for case FI
(see Table 3), which is: 𝜋𝐹𝐼 =

𝑠2 𝜃2
𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

−

2𝑠2 𝑡
𝑘

− 𝑞02 𝛽𝛿 +

2𝑞0 𝑠𝜃
𝑘

+

𝛽𝛿(2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽+𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡−2𝑞0 𝜃))
.
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

Also,

from Table 3, we know the optimal total profit for case F (“free app only” strategy) is: 𝜋𝐹 =
𝑠(𝑠𝜃2 +2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡))
.
𝑘2𝛽

Hence, 𝜋𝐹𝐼 − 𝜋𝐹 =

𝛿((2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )𝑠2 𝜃2 +𝑘 2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)(𝑠𝑡−𝑞0 𝜃)2 )
.
𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

Obviously, both

numerator and denominator are positive. So 𝜋𝐹𝐼 − 𝜋𝐹 > 0. That is to say, as long as unbounded
case FI is feasible, it always dominates unbounded case F.
Proof for Proposition 1(b):
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When the optimal quality of IAP is equal to upper limit (𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂), I obtain the optimal total
profits for cases F and FI (see Table 5), which are: 𝜋𝐹 =
2𝑠2 𝜃2 −2𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)𝛿+
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃2 −𝑠2 𝑡(4−𝑡𝛿)+𝑠(4𝑞0 𝜃−2𝑞̂𝑡𝛿𝜃))
2𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

,

𝛿(2𝑠2 𝜃2 −2𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽2 (1−𝛿)+𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑠𝑡−𝑞̂𝜃)2 )
2𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

𝑠(𝑠𝜃2 +2𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡))
𝑘2𝛽

respectively.

Thus,

and ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 =
𝜋𝐹𝐼 − 𝜋𝐹 =
̅̅̅̅

. To ensure ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 − 𝜋𝐹 > 0 , users’ disutility

sensitivity to advertisement ( 𝑡 ) must satisfy the following condition:

t < 𝑞̂𝜃 −

√2√𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)−𝑠2 𝜃2 )
.
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)𝑠2

Appendix C. Proof for Proposition 2.
In free BA offering strategies, the developer can exploit the quality upper limit by either
providing “only BA with 𝑞 ∗ = 𝑞̂” (bounded case F) or offering “BA + IAP with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂”
(bounded case FI). I obtain the total profits for bounded cases F and FI respectively as below:
̅𝜋̅̅𝐹̅ =
𝜋𝐹𝐼 =
̅̅̅̅

2𝑠(𝑞̂𝜃−𝑠𝑡)
𝑘

− 𝛽(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2, and

2𝑠2 𝜃2 −2𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)𝛿+
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃2 −𝑠2 𝑡(4−𝑡𝛿)+𝑠(4𝑞0 𝜃−2𝑞̂𝑡𝛿𝜃))
.
2𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

Hence,
=

𝜋𝐹𝐼 − ̅𝜋̅̅𝐹̅
̅̅̅̅

−2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂−𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)2 −2𝑠2 𝜃2 −𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑠2 𝑡 2 𝛿+2𝑠(2𝑞0 −𝑞̂(2+𝑡𝛿))𝜃+𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃2 )
−2𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

. Since the denominator is

negative, the numerator must be negative to make ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 − ̅𝜋̅̅𝐹̅ > 0 . Denote the numerator
−2𝑘 2 (𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )2 𝛽 2 (1 − 𝛿)2 − 2𝑠 2 𝜃 2 − 𝑘𝛽(1 − 𝛿)(𝑠 2 𝑡 2 𝛿 + 2𝑠(2𝑞0 − 𝑞̂(2 + 𝑡𝛿))𝜃 +
𝑞̂ 2 𝛿𝜃 2 ) as M. M can be expanded as: −2𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽 2 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽 2 − 2𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 − 𝑘𝑠 2 𝑡 2 𝛽𝛿 +
4𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 𝛿 − 8𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽2 𝛿 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽 2 𝛿 + 𝑘𝑠 2 𝑡 2 𝛽𝛿 2 − 2𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽 2 𝛿 2 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽2 𝛿 2 −
2𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 𝛿 2 − 4𝑘𝑞0 𝑠𝛽𝜃 + 4𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝜃 + 4𝑘𝑞0 𝑠𝛽𝛿𝜃 − 4𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝛽𝛿𝜃 + 2𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝑡𝛽𝛿𝜃 − 2𝑘𝑞̂𝑠𝑡𝛽𝛿 2 𝜃 −
2𝑠 2 𝜃 2 − 𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 + 𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿 2 𝜃 2 .
Factoring all of the 𝑡 2 terms, I get 𝑘𝑠 2 𝑡 2 𝛽(−1 + 𝛿)𝛿. Note that the coefficient of 𝑡 2 is
negative. Thus, I solve for M < 0 with respect to 𝑡 and get: 𝑡 < 𝑡1 or 𝑡 > 𝑡2 where 𝑡1 =
𝑞̂𝑠 3 𝜃 −

√2√−𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿(𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )𝛽(1−𝛿)−𝑠𝜃)2
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿𝑠2

√2√−𝑘𝑠2 𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿(𝑘(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )𝛽(1−𝛿)−𝑠𝜃)2
. Note
𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)𝛿𝑠2

and

𝑡2 = 𝑞̂𝑠 3 𝜃 +

that the term inside the square roots, i.e., −𝑘𝑠 2 𝛽(1 −

𝛿)𝛿(𝑘(𝑞̂ − 𝑞0 )𝛽(1 − 𝛿) − 𝑠𝜃)2 , is always negative. This indicates that 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are not real
numbers. Therefore, M < 0 should always holds, and so ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 − ̅𝜋̅̅𝐹̅ > 0 always holds.
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Appendix D. Proof for Proposition 3.
For a myopic developer who wants to offer IAP, there are two situations: (1) free BA first and
IAP later; and (2) paid BA first and IAP later. I check that for the first situation there might be
either unbounded (unbounded case FIm where 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂) or bounded (bounded case FIm where
𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) scenario; whereas for the second situation only bounded scenario (case PIm where
𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) can take place (similar to Proposition 3). For each scenario, I can solve the optimal
𝑘𝛽(𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡) 2𝑘𝑞0 𝛽−𝑠𝑡𝜃
, 2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

price and quality of IAP. Specifically, (𝑝𝑖∗ , 𝑞𝑖∗ ) are (
1

1

in unbounded free

𝑘𝑞 𝛽

0
BA case, (2 (𝑞̂𝜃 − 𝑠𝑡), 𝑞̂) in bounded free BA case, and (2 𝜃(𝑞̂ − 2𝑘𝛽−𝜃
̂) in paid BA case.
2 ), 𝑞

Appendix E. Proof for Proposition 4.
In this proposition, I compare forward-looking and myopic strategies of IAP offering. There are
three pairs of total profits (forward-looking vs. myopic) for comparison: (1) 𝜋𝐹𝐼 vs. 𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 , (2)
𝜋𝐹𝐼 vs. ̅̅̅̅̅̅,
̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 and (3) ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 vs. 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅̅.
𝑃𝐼𝑚 The above optimal total profits I obtained are listed as
below:
𝑠2 𝜃2

𝜋𝐹𝐼 = 𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿) −
𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 =
𝜋𝐹𝐼 =
̅̅̅̅

− 𝑞02 𝛽𝛿 +

2𝑞0 𝑠𝜃
𝑘

+

𝛽𝛿(2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽+𝑠𝑡(𝑠𝑡−2𝑞0 𝜃))
,
2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2

2𝑘𝑠𝛽𝜃2 (𝑠(1+𝑡+𝛿)−𝑞0 𝜃)−𝑠2 (1+𝛿)𝜃4 +𝑘 2 𝛽 2 (𝑞0 𝜃−𝑠𝑡)(𝑠(4−𝑡𝛿)+𝑞0 𝛿𝜃)
,
𝑘 2 𝛽(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )

2𝑠2 𝜃2 −2𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)𝛿+𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)(𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃2 −𝑠2 𝑡(4−𝑡𝛿)+𝑠(4𝑞0 𝜃−2𝑞̂𝑡𝛿𝜃))
,
2𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 =
̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 =
̅̅̅̅

2𝑠2 𝑡
𝑘

𝑘𝛽(−2𝑘(𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽𝛿−𝑠2 𝑡(4−𝑡𝛿))+2𝑘𝑠𝛽(2𝑞0 −𝑞̂𝑡𝛿)𝜃+(𝑘𝑞̂2 𝛽𝛿+2𝑠2 (1+𝛿))𝜃2
,
2𝑘 2 𝛽

2𝑘𝛽(𝑞02 −𝑞0 𝑞̂(3−𝛿)𝛿+𝑞̂2 (2−𝛿)𝛿)𝜃2 −𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)𝛿−𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃4

𝜋𝑃𝐼𝑚 =
̅̅̅̅̅̅

𝑘(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃2 )

, and

𝑘 2 𝛽 2 (12𝑞̂2 𝛿−20𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛿+𝑞02 (4+9𝛿))𝜃2 −2𝑘𝛽(𝑞02 +3𝑞̂(𝑞̂−𝑞0 )𝛿)𝜃4 +𝑞̂2 𝛿𝜃6 −8𝑘 3 (𝑞0 −𝑞̂)2 𝛽3 𝛿
.
2𝑘(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )2

First, I compared 𝜋𝐹𝐼 and 𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 . Since 𝜋𝐹𝐼 − 𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 =

𝑠2 𝛿 2 𝜃2
𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿)

> 0, FI (forward-

looking offering of “free BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂) always dominates FIm (myopic offering of
“free BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ < 𝑞̂) as long as concavity and feasibility condition for case FI holds.
𝑠2 𝛿 2 𝜃2

Second, I compare ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 and ̅̅̅̅̅̅.
𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 Since ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝐹𝐼𝑚 = 𝑘 2 𝛽(1−𝛿) > 0, bounded case
FI (forward-looking offering of “free BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) always dominates bounded case
FIm (myopic offering of “free BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) as long as feasibility and/or concavity
condition for case FI holds.
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Third,

I

compare

and

𝜋𝑃𝐼
̅̅̅̅

𝜋𝑃𝐼𝑚
̅̅̅̅̅̅

.

𝜋𝑃𝐼 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼𝑚

((𝛽𝛿 2 𝜃2 (𝑘 2 (𝑞0 −2𝑞̂)2 𝛽 2 (1−𝛿)+2𝑘𝛽(𝑞02 (6−𝛿)−2𝑞̂2 (1−𝛿)−𝑞0 𝑞̂(3+𝛿))𝜃2 +𝑞̂(4𝑞0 +𝑞̂(1−𝛿))𝜃4 ))
. Since
(2(𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)−2𝜃2 )(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )2 ))

=

(𝑘𝛽(4 −

𝛿)(1 − 𝛿) − 2𝜃 2 ) < 0 (concavity condition for bounded FBI), the denominator is negative. To
make ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 − 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑃𝐼𝑚 < 0, the numerator must be positive. So I examine this condition next. The
numerator

((𝛽𝛿 2 𝜃 2 (𝑘 2 (𝑞0 − 2𝑞̂)2 𝛽2 (1 − 𝛿) + 2𝑘𝛽 (𝑞02 (6 − 𝛿) − 2𝑞̂ 2 (1 − 𝛿) − 𝑞0 𝑞̂(3 +

𝛿)) 𝜃 2 + 𝑞̂(4𝑞0 + 𝑞̂(1 − 𝛿))𝜃 4 ))

=

−𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽2 − 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 + 𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽 2 𝛿 −

4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽 2 𝛿 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 𝛿 − 12𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝜃 2 + 6𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝜃 2 + 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 +
2𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑞0 𝑞̂𝜃 4 − 𝑞̂ 2 𝜃 4 + 𝑞̂ 2 𝛿𝜃 4. Now we check whether the following
inequality holds:
−𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽 2 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽2 − 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽 2 + 𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 𝛿 − 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽 2 𝛿 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 𝛿 − 12𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝜃 2 +
6𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝜃 2 + 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑞0 𝑞̂𝜃 4 − 𝑞̂ 2 𝜃 4 +
𝑞̂ 2 𝛿𝜃 4 > 0

(1).

Putting together all the 𝑞02 terms in inequality (1), I get −𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 + 𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 𝛿 −
12𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 = −𝑘𝛽(𝑘𝛽(1 − 𝛿) + 2(6 − 𝛿)𝜃 2 )𝑞02 . Note that the coefficient of
𝑞02 in inequality (1) is negative. Solving inequality (1) w.r.t. 𝑞0 , I obtain:
𝑞̂(𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)+2𝜃2 )(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )−√2√𝑞̂2 𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )2 (−𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)+2𝜃2 )
𝑘𝛽(𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)+2(6−𝛿)𝜃2 )
𝑞̂(𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)+2𝜃2 )(2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )+√2√𝑞̂2 𝜃2 (2𝑘𝛽−𝜃2 )2 (−𝑘𝛽(4−𝛿)(1−𝛿)+2𝜃2 )
𝑘𝛽(𝑘𝛽(1−𝛿)+2(6−𝛿)𝜃2 )

< 𝑞0 <
(2).

Thus, if inequality (2) holds, inequality (1) also holds and ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 − 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑃𝐼𝑚 < 0. However,
since (−𝑘𝛽(4 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝛿) + 2𝜃 2 ) < 0 (concavity condition for bounded case PI), the two
critical values in inequality (2) are not real numbers. Therefore, ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼𝑚 < 0 can never
happen. In other words, the opposite direction of inequality (1) should always hold, i.e.,
−𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽 2 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽 2 − 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 + 𝑘 2 𝑞02 𝛽2 𝛿 − 4𝑘 2 𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽2 𝛿 + 4𝑘 2 𝑞̂2 𝛽2 𝛿 − 12𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝜃 2 +
6𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝜃 2 + 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞02 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 + 2𝑘𝑞0 𝑞̂𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑘𝑞̂ 2 𝛽𝛿𝜃 2 − 4𝑞0 𝑞̂𝜃 4 − 𝑞̂ 2 𝜃 4 +
𝑞̂ 2 𝛿𝜃 4 < 0

(3). Hence, ̅̅̅̅
𝜋𝑃𝐼 − 𝜋
̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑃𝐼𝑚 > 0 always holds, indicating bounded case PI

(forward-looking offering of “paid BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂) always dominates bounded case
PIm (myopic offering of “paid BA + IAP” with 𝑞𝑖∗ = 𝑞̂).
In summary, for a developer who offers IAP, forward-looking strategy always
outperforms myopic strategy no matter whether the developer launches the initial app for free
or paid.
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Abstract
The choice of revenue models is critical for a mobile application (app) developer’s success. In
this paper, I examine the revenue model selection for a profit oriented app developer. From app
developers’ perspective, I show that under information asymmetry condition “trial and then free
without ads” (TF) strategy is always suboptimal. “Trial and then paid” (TP) strategy is dominant
if users are highly (not very) sensitive to app price as well as market size is small (big); otherwise,
“trial and then free with ads” (TFA) strategy is dominant. The welfare analysis suggests that the
optimal strategy is dependent on market size and users’ attributes. Additionally, this paper
examines developer’s decisions on ranking effort in the trial period and ad frequency in the later
period.

Keywords: App Developer, App Ranking, In-App Advertisement (IADV), Ad Frequency,
Product Offering.
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1. Introduction
As indispensable software for mobile devices, mobile applications (apps) have been
vastly changing the way of communication, work, socialization, and recreation, and the number
of apps has been growing rapidly in the recent years. As of June 2016, the number of apps
available on the two leading platforms (Android and iOS) are 2.2 million and 2 million
respectively (Statista, 2016). Since the screen of smartphones is small while there are a large
number of apps available on the same platform, consumers usually choose to download those
displayed on the top-ranking list (Garg and Telang, 2013). It is also observed that the majority
of apps offered in app platforms are free and most of the free apps have embedded
advertisements (ads) (Eberhardt, 2014), which are so-called in-app advertisements (IADVs)7.
Empirical evidence suggests that consumers embrace free apps more than paid apps although
the former have IADVs (e.g., Garg and Telang, 2013). However, users’ engagement with an
installed app is negatively impacted by the placement frequency of ads (Armour, 2017). In the
worst situation, a user would choose to uninstall an app if she is drastically annoyed by frequent
pop-up ads. Therefore, an app developer should try to boost the ranking of its app and carefully
decide whether to charge users for the app. However, there are some factors that a developer
should consider when making decisions regarding ranking effort and pricing strategies of the
app.
First, there are many ways that may help boost an app’s ranking (e.g., utilize multiple
traffic sources, drive downloads from current users, require users to score the app rating, etc.).
However, as most ranking efforts require investment, a developer should evaluate investment in
ranking effort and the revenue gained from the effort. Second, app users are heterogeneous in
terms of their preferences (Lee and Raghu, 2014). As users can only know how much they
would use an app after a usage period (Wei and Nault, 2013), there is difference between app
users’ willingness to download an app and willingness to use an installed app. Users’ willingness
to download an app is mostly impacted by the app’s perceived quality, ranking position, and app
price (Yu et al., 2017a; Ifrach and Johari, 2014). Whereas users’ willingness to engage with the
installed app can be affected by the ex-post quality of the app and the price required to pay for
playing it.
There are several ways that app developers may launch apps: let users try the app for a
short period and then decide to offer an option such as keeping the app free but embedding ads
into it, charging users without adding any additional features, or offering more features with in-

7

Ghose and Han (2014) use “IADV” to stand for in app advertisement.
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app purchase (IAP) options. The advantages of trial usage lie in several folds. First, it enables a
developer to capture a big enough user base and helps increase the app’s ranking. Second, it
allows the developer to collect users’ information which are valuable for making decisions on
how to recoup revenues from the captured users. Third, the trial period allows the developer to
test and debug its app product. The problem faced by app developers is that although users’
willingness-to-download is not difficult to estimate, the information of users’ willingness-toplay is not easy to obtain when an app is launched. To our knowledge, most existing analytical
models for information product offerings assume information symmetry, i.e., users’ information
is known to the developer at the very beginning (e.g., Weber, 2008, Wei and Nault, 2013). As
exceptions, Chellapa and Shivendu (2010) and Chellappa and Mehra (2017) consider both
information symmetry and asymmetry assumptions in their models. The above two articles do
not consider free and paid offerings simultaneously for a developer’s product offering strategies.
As Yu et al. (2017a) and Yu et al. (2017b) have pointed out, consumers’ disutility sensitivity to
free apps might be different from that to paid apps. So a developer must be careful when
choosing between free and paid offering strategies. I note that in Yu et al.’s (2017a, b) models,
the average ad revenue per user is assumed to be predetermined by the market. In reality, a
developer can actually determine how frequently to display ads in a free app, thereby
influencing the average ad revenue per user (Ivanov, 2015). To summarize, the above discussion
suggests that it is not suitable to simply apply existing analytical models to the free-trial and
then fee-or-free setting.
The objective of the current research is to investigate app developers’ decisions on
ranking effort and whether to charge users for the app after a trial period. I build a two-period
model by considering the following decision variables for the app developer: app quality, app
ranking effort, ad placement frequency, and app price. For tractability purpose, I do not consider
quality improvement8. Also, I only consider the situation that an app is offered for either free
with/without ads or paid without ads. In specific, in the first period (“trial period” or “Period T”
hereinafter), users download and install an app, and are allowed to use it for free. In this period,
the developer does not show users any ads but will collect users’ information. In the second
period (“usage period” or “Period U” hereinafter) the current users engage with the app. In this
period, based on the users’ information obtained in Period T, the developer will decide whether
to charge the current users; even if it does not charge users in this period, it would display ads
to the current users. I define the former strategy as “trial and then paid (TP)” while the latter
8

In Yu et al. (2017b), the authors consider in app purchase (IAP) issue in a two-period model, where IAP
has higher quality than the basic app.
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“trial and then free with ads (TFA)”. In this setting, the developer’s revenue comes from two
periods: the revenue generated in Period T, and the revenue paid off from advertisers for users’
clicks on the ads or users’ direct payment in Period U. I am particularly interested in the
following questions: (1) How frequently should a developer display ads to its users if it adopts
TFA strategy? (2) How much should the developer charge users if it adopts TP strategy? (3)
How much effort should the developer put into boosting the app ranking? (4) What quality level
should the developer set for the app? (5) Which strategy can result in relatively high total welfare?
This research potentially makes contributions to both academic research and industry
practice. First, this paper enriches the literature on decision making for app developers’ product
offering. The present study extends Yu et al. (2017a) and Yu et al. (2017b) by relaxing the
assumption that average ad revenue per user is exogenously given. In the current research, I
consider the scenario when a developer can determine average ad revenue per user via setting
ad frequency. Moreover, I include app ranking effort in the model. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first article that considers both IADV display frequency and app ranking effort in an
analytical model. Third, the findings from the analysis have managerial implications.
Specifically, I show that from a developer’s perspective, after a trial period, the option of either
switching to “paid” app or keeping the app “free” but embedding ads in it can be optimal
depending on both users’ disutility sensitivity to app price and market size; whereas keeping the
app “free” without embedding ads in it is always suboptimal. I also show that, from policy
makers’ perspective, total welfare realized in either “free” or “paid” offering can be higher
dependent on users’ willingness to play and market size. The model and analytical results can
also address similar decision problems that are prevalent in information goods industry (e.g.,
online content products).
This article is structured as follows. In the next section, I summarize relevant literature.
Section 3 presents the assumptions and model structure. Section 4 provides my analysis based
on the model I created and summarizes the major findings. In section 5, I conduct numerical
analyses. The article is concluded with remarks in Section 6 drawing a big picture of what I
have done and pointing out future directions.

2. Relevant Literature
There are several literature streams that are closely related to this paper, including those
about information product offering strategies, particularly the choice of revenue models. I
provide a brief review of each literature stream and discuss how my study is related to them.
One set of articles closely tied to the present research is about product offering strategies
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of information goods. Prior analytical studies on this topic have investigated new product
development (Krishanan and Zhu, 2006; Chen et al., 2010), product versioning and pricing
(Bala and Carr, 2009; Wei and Nault, 2013), product development cost structure (Jones and
Mendelson, 2011; Chellappa and Mehra, 2017), competition game (Chambers, et al., 2006;
Jones and Mendelson, 2011), and product delivery systems (Guo et al., 2015). For example,
Guo et al. (2015) study delivery systems (push vs. pull) of online contents faced by producers
and consumers. Offering decisions for mobile apps, one type of information goods mostly
appearing in the recent years, have also caught scholars’ attention; yet, analytical research on
this topic is still lacking (Yu et al., 2017a). In mobile app industry, the app products are
experience goods and users have to install an app before using it. Also, there are multiple app
platforms and revenue sources for app developers’ selection. Moreover, an app’s product
visibility, reflected as app ranking, is critical for a developer to capture users. All the above
characteristics as a combination makes mobile app offering decisions require a distinct research
setting. In fact, due to the unique characteristics of mobile apps, most existing analytical models
regarding product offering strategies cannot be simply applied to this industry (Yu et al., 2017a).
Yu et al. (2017a) investigate app developers’ platform selection strategies when launching either
paid or free version of an app, while Yu et al. (2017b) consider app developers’ product
versioning decisions by focusing on in-app purchase. This paper differentiates from Yu et al.
(2017a, b) in several aspects. First, I consider the scenario when a developer can determine ad
placement frequency which has not been addressed by Yu et al. (2017a, b). Second, I consider
a developer’s ranking effort for its app product which also has not been studied by Yu et al.
(2017a, b). Third, in the current two-period model I assume that users’ willingness-to-download
is known but their willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer when an app is launched; the
developer is able to obtain users’ information of willingness-to-play during the trial period.
Further, there are a number of articles looking into the choice of revenue models for
information good producers. Pauwels and Weiss’ (2008) empirical study shows that charging
users for online content after a free period can be a good choice if the target users are
professionals. Many other articles have empirically documented that charging users for
information goods is challenging (Shampanier et al., 2007; Ghose and Han, 2014). This stems
largely from consumers’ sensitivity to the price of information goods (Yu et al., 2017a). Due to
this fact, the “free” strategy, usually accompanying with ads, has been prevalent in this industry.
However, the profitability of free strategy is hinged on certain market conditions. For example,
Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) find that matching an ad to online content and increasing an ad’s
obtrusiveness can independently increase users’ purchase intent; however, doing both at the
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same time actually reduces users’ purchase intent. In a recent study by Lambrecht and Misra
(2017), the authors address the problem of how online content producers price their product and
make the trade-off between advertising and subscription when consumers’ valuations change
overtime. Although the current paper also considers app developers’ choice of offering the app
either-free-or-paid, my work differs from Lambrecht and Misra (2017) in that I take into account
the product development cost. Goldfarb and Tucker’s (2011) findings provide empirical
evidence for my assumptions that users’ information collected in the trial period is critical for a
developer’s offering decision in the later period and that ad frequency must be carefully
determined.

3. Model
This section demonstrates my two-period model structure in terms of user utility, cost
for boosting app ranking, app development cost, and total profit function.
Suppose a “monopolistic” app developer is considering whether to provide users an app
product in a platform (e.g., iOS platform) with quality level of 𝑞 (see Table 1 for notations).
App quality is referred to as an aggregate measure of quality characteristics or attributes (Rosen,
1974; Yu et al., 2017a). The quality attributes include aspects such as an app’s functionalities,
user friendliness, trustworthiness by users (user review), and so forth (Kuehnhausen and Frost,
2013; Yu et al., 2017a). The developer will offer users a trial period and decide whether to keep
the app free with ads (“trial and then free with ads” strategy) or charge users (“trial and then
paid” strategy). Suppose the developer would put an effort of ℎ (ℎ > 0) in boosting the app’s
ranking 𝑟 (𝑟 ∈ ℕ+ )9. In practice, an app’s ranking is impacted by factors including the quality
perceived by users and the ranking effort made by the developer. These factors influence
downloads for the app and ultimately determine the app’s ranking position. I therefore simply
assume that app ranking, app quality and ranking effort are related to each other such that
𝑎

(1),

𝑟 = ℎ𝑞
where 𝑎 is a positive constant.

9

Note that smaller 𝑟 means higher ranking. For example, app A ranked second has higher ranking
position than app B ranked 5th.
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Table 1. Notations
Parameters
𝑠

Ad revenue per click (𝑠 > 0)

𝑣

Revenue per user gained by the developer in Period T (𝑣 > 0)

𝑐

Average cost per user for download and usage in Period T (𝑐 > 0)

𝜃𝑑

Users’ willingness to trial use the app (𝜃𝑑 ~ 𝑈(0,1))

𝜃𝑢

Users’ willingness to use after the trial period (𝜃𝑢 ~ 𝑈 ( 𝑁𝑑 , 1))

𝛾

Cost parameter of ranking effort (𝛾 > 0)

𝛽

App development difficulty (or cost parameter for app development,

𝐷

𝛽 > 0)
𝑁

Total number of potential users (or market size, 𝑁 ∈ ℕ+ )

𝛿

Time discount factor (0 < 𝛿 < 1)

𝑎

A positive constant (𝑎 > 0)

𝑡

Users’ disutility sensitivity to app price
Decision Variables

𝑞

App quality (𝑞 > 0)

ℎ

Developer’s effort on boosting the app ranking (or termed “ranking effort”,
ℎ > 0)

𝑓

Ad frequency (𝑓 > 0)

𝑝

App price (𝑝 > 0)
Other Parameters

𝑟

App ranking (𝑟 =

𝑎
,
ℎ𝑞

𝑟 ∈ ℕ+ )

𝑈𝑑

Net utility gained by a user by trial using the app

𝑈𝑢

Net utility gained by a user in Period U

𝐷𝑑

Realized demand in Period T

𝐷𝑢

Realized demand in Period U

𝜋𝑑

Profit gained by the developer in Period T

𝜋𝑢

Profit gained by the developer in Period U

Further, I assume the total number of potential users for this app is 𝑁 (𝑁 ∈ ℕ+ ), and
𝐷

the users are uniformly distributed with 𝜃𝑑 ~ 𝑈(0,1) and 𝜃𝑢 ~ 𝑈 ( 𝑁𝑑 , 1), where 𝜃𝑑 and 𝜃𝑢
represent users’ willingness to use the trial and willingness to play the app respectively, and 𝐷𝑑
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is the number of users who use trial of the app (i.e., realized demand in Period T). According to
Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2002), the uniform distribution assumption should not change the
qualitative directions of analytical results for the model. Before downloading the app, a user can
only perceive the quality of the app, which can be a function of attributes such as the app’s
description, other users’ reviews, the app’s ratings, and so forth. She downloads an app mainly
based on her perception of the app quality as well as the app’s ranking. Further assume that by
using trial of the app, a user gains net utility
𝑈𝑑 = 𝜃𝑑 /𝑟 − 𝑐
where the positive constant 𝑐

(2),

denotes the costs regarding download, install, and play the app

during Period T. Combining equations (1) and (2) we have
(3).

𝑈𝑑 = 𝜃𝑑 ℎ𝑞/𝑎 − 𝑐

Since only those users who can gain positive net utility would try the app, the demand
𝑎𝑐

realized by the developer in Period T is: 𝐷𝑑 = 𝑁(1 − ℎ𝑞). Fig. 1 provides a visual illustration
of demand modeling.
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Fig. 1. Realized Demand in Both Periods. An app developer offers an app with quality of 𝑞
for free in a trial period (Period T), and then keeps the app free by displaying ads with a
frequency of (𝑓) or charges users at a price of 𝑝 in the usage period (Period U). In Period T,
the developer also makes effort in boosting app ranking (ℎ) which will determine the app’s
ranking. Users are uniformly distributed in terms of willingness to download (WTD, 𝜃𝑑 ) and
willingness to play (WTP, 𝜃𝑢 ). Users evaluate the app based on both app quality and app
ranking when choosing to download it. A representative user locating in a position of the market
will realize net utility of 𝑈𝑑 (or 𝑈𝑢 ) by participating in each period. Those who can realize
positive net utility are captured by the developer (highlighted with shadow). 𝑐: trial usage cost,
𝑎: positive constant, and 𝑡: users’ disutility sensitivity to app price.

In Period U, the current users are able to reevaluate the app quality based on their
experience in using the app during Period T. For simplicity, I assume that both perceived and
experienced qualities of the app have the same level (both are equal to 𝑞). However, I assume
users’ willingness to play (𝜃𝑢 ) can be different from the willingness to download (𝜃𝑑 ), which
acts as a proxy of users’ reevaluation (𝜃𝑢 𝑞) of the app quality. In this period, the developer
decides whether to (1) charge users a price 𝑝, or (2) keep the app free but display ads with a
frequency of 𝑓. I assume further the developer gains ad revenue per click (denoted by 𝑠). Also,
according to Yu et al. (2017a), users have higher disutility sensitivity to paid version than to free
version of the same app. In Yu et al.’s (2017a) research setting, it is implicitly assumed that users
know free apps are embedded with certain amount of ads requiring click when using the apps.
In the current paper, I assume that users will know how much she must “pay” to play the app
either by spending real money or by bearing annoyance from ads. Hence, I relax Yu et al.’s
(2017a) assumption by assuming that users’ disutility sensitivity to app price (denoted by 𝑡)
can be either higher or lower than users’ disutility sensitivity to ads (which is normalized to 1).
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Hence, by playing the installed app in Period U, a user can gain net utility: 𝑈𝑢 = 𝜃𝑢 𝑞 − 𝑓𝑠
(TFA strategy) or 𝑈𝑢 = 𝜃𝑢 𝑞 − 𝑡𝑝 (TP strategy). Thus similarly, the demand realized by the
𝑎𝑐

𝑓𝑠
)
𝑞

developer in Period U is 𝐷𝑢 = 𝑁(1 − ℎ𝑞 )(1 −

𝑎𝑐

and 𝐷𝑢 = 𝑁(1 − ℎ𝑞 )(1 −

𝑡𝑝
)
𝑞

for TFA

and TP strategies, respectively.
Next, I model the cost structure for the developer. In the current research setting, I
assume that ad placement related cost is negligible; hence, there are two cost components
needed to be incurred: cost for ranking effort and app development. I adopt quadratic form that
has been used by many prior studies (e.g., Desai, 2001) in modeling the above cost components.
In specific, the cost for ranking efforts is: 𝛾𝑟 2 , where the positive constant 𝛾 is the cost
parameter of ranking effort; and the app development cost is: 𝛽𝑞 2 , where the positive constant
𝛽 is the difficulty parameter of the app development. All costs are assumed to be incurred in
Period T.
Revenues for the developer come from both periods. In Period T, users provide some
information when downloading and using the app. The information such as users’ demographics
and usage habits gathered in Period T may be sold to other parties or be utilized for the decisions
for Period U and/or other business activities for the developer itself, thereby generating some
revenues (Seneviratne et al., 2015; Meng, et al., 2016). So I assume that the developer can gain
revenue per user (denoted by 𝑣) in Period T. In Period U, depending on either-free-or-paid
strategy set, the developer gains ad revenue per user (𝑓𝑠) for TFA strategy (or 𝑝 for TP
strategy). Thus, the profit gained by the developer in the two periods are expressed as below.
Period T: 𝜋𝑑 = 𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2

Period U: 𝜋𝑢 = 𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) (1 −

𝑓𝑠
)𝑓𝑠
𝑞

𝜋𝑢 = 𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) (1 −

𝑡𝑝
)𝑝
𝑞

(3)
(TFA strategy) (4)
(TP strategy) (5)

Denote 𝛿 (0 < 𝛿 < 1) as the time discount factor. Therefore, the objective for the
profit-maximizing developer is to achieve optimal total profit from both periods. That is:
max (𝑁 (1 −
𝑞,ℎ,𝑓

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

max (𝑁 (1 −
𝑞,ℎ,𝑝

s.t. 0 < 1 −

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 ) + 𝛿(𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 ) + 𝛿(𝑁 (1 −

≤ 1, 1 −

𝑓𝑠
𝑞

) (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

𝑓𝑠
)𝑓𝑠)
𝑞

) (1 −

𝑡𝑝
)𝑝)
𝑞

(TFA strategy) (6), or
(TP strategy) (7),

≤ 1, 0 < 𝛿 < 1, 𝑁 ∈ ℕ+ , and 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑣, 𝛾, 𝑓, 𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑞, ℎ, 𝛽 > 0.
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In the above system, the component 𝑁 (1 −
generated in Period T; while the component 𝑁 (1 −
𝑡𝑝
)𝑝)
𝑞

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞
𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 represents profit

) (1 −

𝑓𝑠
)𝑓𝑠
𝑞

(or 𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) (1 −

represents profit generated in Period U. Components 𝛾ℎ2 and 𝛽𝑞 2 are the costs for

ranking efforts and app development, respectively. Note that both the cost components are
incurred in Period T. As for the developer, the decision variables include 𝑞, ℎ and 𝑓 (or 𝑝).
It is worth to note that for 𝑓 = 𝑝 = 0, both systems (6) and (7) can be simplified as the same
model as follows. In fact, in this special case, the developer does not display any ads or charge
users after the trial period. I call this strategy “trial and then free without ads” (TF).
max (𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 )

s.t. 0 < 1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

≤ 1, 𝑁 ∈ ℕ+ , and 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑣, 𝛾, 𝑞, ℎ, 𝛽 > 0.

𝑞,ℎ

(TF strategy) (8)

4. Analysis
Now I analyze the models described in the previous section and examine the analytical
results that correspond to my research questions. I also conduct analyses of welfare-efficient
prices for the several offering strategies.
In the current research setting, the developer makes decisions on quality level (𝑞) and
ranking effort (ℎ) for the app in Period T; in Period U, the developer decides a frequency (𝑓)
for the ads shown to users or the price (𝑝) for the app. I checked that the objective function in
system (6) is strictly concave in 𝑞 and ℎ. I therefore solved system (6) with respect to 𝑞 and
ℎ, and then substituted (𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ ) back into system (6). I further checked that the objective
function is strictly concave in 𝑓, so I solved the system with respect to 𝑓. After this step, we
can simply substitute (𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) into the objective function in system (6) to obtain the optimal
total profit (𝜋 𝑇𝐹𝐴 ) for TFA strategy. For system (7), the model for TP strategy, I found similar
property of concavity. Thus, I can solve the model following the steps that I solved for system
(6). System (8) is a special case of system (6) or (7), so it is easy to solve for the optimal metrics.
Table 2 lists the optimal solution and the corresponding optimal total profit for each strategy.
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Table 2. Optimal Matrix for Each Strategy
TFA
Quality
(𝑞)
Ranking
Effort (ℎ)
Ad Fr. (𝑓)
Total
Profit (𝜋)

𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
𝑎1⁄4 𝛽1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
221⁄4 𝛽3⁄8 𝑠
𝑎3⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 𝛿 𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 5⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝛿
𝑁𝑣 −
+
223⁄4 𝛽1⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4
421⁄4 𝛽3⁄8
− 2√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁√𝑣
TP

Quality
(𝑞)
Ranking
Effort (ℎ)
Price (𝑝)
Total
Profit (𝜋)

𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
𝑎1⁄4 𝛽1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
221⁄4 𝛽3⁄8 𝑡
221⁄4 𝑎3⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 𝛿 23⁄4 𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 5⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝛿
𝑁𝑣 −
+
8𝑡𝛽 1⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4
8𝑡𝛽 3⁄8
− 2√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁√𝑣
TF

Quality
(𝑞)
Ranking
Effort (ℎ)
Total

𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
𝑎1⁄4 𝛽1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
𝑁𝑣 − 2√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁√𝑣

Profit (𝜋)
4.1 “Trial and then Free with Ads” Strategy
If a developer chooses to continue the free offering and embed ads into the app after the
trial period (TFA strategy), how should the developer make decisions? In this strategy, if the
developer determines the ad frequency based on users’ information gathered during the trial
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period, I show that it should set quality and ad frequency as well as ranking effort in accordance
with Proposition 1. All proofs are provided in appendix.
Proposition 1. Optimal app quality, ranking effort, and ad frequency for a developer in TFA
strategy: If users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before
launching an app (i.e., information asymmetry), the developer should set
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

ℎ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

and 𝑓 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑠

𝑞∗ =

∎

Furthermore, as summarized in Lemma 1, our result suggests that in this strategy, by
setting ad frequency 𝑓 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑠

the developer will capture only half of the users

that have been captured in the trial period.
Lemma 1. For a developer adopting TFA strategy under information asymmetry condition, to
achieve maximal total profit, it should only focus on half of the users captured in the trial period
1

(i.e., 𝐷𝑢∗ = 2 𝐷𝑡∗). ∎
Here is the interpretation for Lemma 1: In Period U, the developer can decide how
frequently to place ads. If it displays ads to users too frequently, most users will not play or will
even uninstall the app. On the other hand, if the developer shows ads to users not often, most
users will be willing to engage with the app, but the ad revenue gained by the developer would
be low since there will not be too many clicks on the ads.
Moreover, under information asymmetry condition, if the developer adopts TFA strategy,
then the ad frequency should be set based on the optimal app quality and the per-click ad revenue.
Lemma 2 summarizes this relation.
Lemma 2. If users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before
launching an app, there is a relation among the optimal ad frequency, the optimal app quality
and per-click ad revenue, which is 𝑓 ∗ =

𝑞∗
.
2𝑠

∎

Lemma 2 actually answers one of the research questions: How frequently should a
developer display ads to the users? The finding shows that it depends on both app quality (𝑞)
and per-click ad revenue (𝑠). In specific, if the app quality is high, implying the app is well
designed (large 𝑞), users can bear annoyance from relatively frequent ads (allowing large 𝑓).
This is consistent with our intuition. For example, an app with functionalities or features that
align with users' preferences can entice current users to play the app; as a result, it is feasible to
display more ads. On the other hand, if the ads are designed with attributes of overly annoyances
(e.g., an ad showed to consumers is long each time, which is likely to bring about high average
ad revenue per user for the developer), users would engage less often with the app. As a result,
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the developer should display the ads less frequently (small 𝑓). For instance, although longer ad
is likely to bring about higher average ad revenue per user (large 𝑠), in general users would be
easy to get upset if the display time of an ad is too long, which suggests that the ad frequency
(𝑓) should not be set too high.
4.2 “Trial and then Paid” Strategy
As an alternative, the developer can choose to charge the current users without placing
any ads after a trial period. I show that under information asymmetry condition, the developer
should set quality and ad frequency as well as ranking effort in accordance with Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Optimal app quality, ranking effort, and app price for a developer in TP strategy:
If users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before launching an app,
the developer should set 𝑞 ∗ =
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑡

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

, ℎ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

, and 𝑝∗ =

∎

Proposition 2 indicates that under information asymmetry condition, it is possible for a
developer adopting TP strategy to identify optimal decisions on the quality level, ranking effort
and the price for its app product.
Further, I show in Lemma 3 that to take TP strategy the app price should not be set just
based on the app quality. Rather, the developer should carefully examine users’ disutility
sensitivity to app price before making a pricing decision. Typically, the more sensitive users are
to app price, the lower price should be set. Lemma 3 is similar to Lemma 2. At the first glance,
the only difference is: when switching from a trial to a paid version of the app, the price set is
dependent on how sensitive the current users would react to the price; whereas when switching
to a free app with embedded ads, ad frequency is dependent on the per-click ad revenue. As a
matter of fact, per-click ad revenue can be treated as a proxy of users’ disutility sensitivity to
the app’s “price” (the annoyance from ads in the research context).
Lemma 3. If users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before
launching an app, there is a relation among the optimal app price, the optimal app quality and
𝑞∗

users’ disutility sensitivity to app price, which is 𝑝∗ = 2𝑡. ∎
4.3 Fee or Free?
In this subsection, I identify the dominant strategy for the developer. As discussed earlier,
from the developer’s perspective, “trial and then free without ads” (TF) strategy is a special case
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of either “trial and then free with ads” (TFA) or “trial and then paid” strategy, so TF is a
suboptimal strategy. I further show that either TFA or TP strategy can be dominant under certain
conditions. Proposition 3 summarizes our finding.
Proposition 3. Dominance of product offering strategies: If users’ information of willingnessto-play is unknown to a developer before launching an app, “trial and then paid” (TP) strategy
is dominant if users’ sensitivity to app price 𝑡 > 1 (𝑡 < 1) as well as market size 𝑁 <
(𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

); otherwise, “trial and then free with ads” (TFA) strategy is dominant. ∎

Proposition 3 indicates that under information asymmetry condition, it is better off for a
developer to charge users directly when market size is small as well as users are more sensitive
to app price than to ads. In this situation, offering users the app for free with ads cannot result
in enough revenues for the developer to compensate the costs for app development and ranking
effort. Rather, it is more profitable to charge users directly. On the other hand, when market size
is large as well as users are less sensitive to app price than to ads, it is highly possible to charge
users a high price without worrying about chasing away users. As has been found, it is more
profitable to charge users for online content after a free period if the target users are professional
(e.g., Pauwels and Weiss, 2008). In general, professional users are insensitive to app price. Our
finding suggests that if a developer wants to charge the current professional users it must make
sure that the user base captured is big enough. Jiang and Sarkar (2009) and Prasad et al. (2003)
provide an explanation for the “free” strategy: it increases the speed of diffusion. The increasing
diffusion of an information product (app in our research context) actually can increase the net
present value of future revenue generation from sources such as direct payments from users
and/or advertising. Based on my analytical result, when market size is large while users are
relatively insensitive to ads as opposed to app price, the developer should adopt “trial and then
free with ads” (TFA) strategy. This is consistent with Jiang and Sarkar’s (2009) and Prasad et
al.’s (2003) since the diffusion speed could be even faster in a market with a large number of
potential users who are insensitive to ads.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
In this subsection, I conduct welfare analyses in order to see which strategy can actually
result in higher total welfare gained by an app developer and its users. According to Jones and
Mendelson (2011), “with information goods, the welfare-efficient price of any product,
regardless of its quality, is zero.” I want to investigate whether the welfare can be improved if
an app developer embeds ads within its free app or charges users for the app. I define total
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welfare as the sum of net utility gained by app users and profit gained by the developer in both
periods. Thus, for each offering strategy, we can calculate the total welfare that it can result in.
I first compare the total welfares between TF and TFA strategies. The finding is summarized in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Total welfares between TF and TFA strategies: If users’ information of
willingness-to-play (𝜃𝑢 ) is unknown to a developer before launching an app, then when 𝜃𝑢 <
1
2

1

(𝜃𝑢 > 2) and market size 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

(𝑁 <

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

), TFA strategy results in more total

welfare than TF strategy. ∎
Based on the analytical results, under information asymmetry condition, in a large (small)
app market and users’ willingness-to-play is low (high), strategy of placing ads can lead to
higher total welfare compared to not displaying ads. The result suggests that Jones and
Mendelson's (2011) conclusion holds only when market size is large (small) but users’
willingness-to-play is high (low). If this condition does not hold, total welfare can actually be
improved by “charging” users indirectly via displaying ads. Proposition 4 provides an insight to
the platform companies such as Apple Inc. In practice, a platform company would like to
improve the total welfare of the whole ecosystem so that it can be more sustainable. With such
insights, the platform company can know better on how to incentivize third party developers’
pricing and ad placement decisions with a goal of improving total welfare.
I further compare total welfares between TP and TFA strategies. The finding is
summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Total welfares between TP and TFA strategies: If users’ information of
willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before launching an app, then when users’
2

disutility sensitivity to app price 𝑡 > 1−2𝜃

𝑢

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾
𝑣

2

(𝑡 < 1−2𝜃 ) and market size 𝑁 >
𝑢

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾
𝑣

(𝑁 <

), TP strategy results in higher total welfare than TFA strategy. ∎
Proposition 5 suggests that, under certain conditions, there could be a space for

improving total welfare by charging users directly. Specifically, when users are highly sensitive
(insensitive) to app price and market size is large (small), total welfare can actually be increased
by charging users directly than letting users use the app for free but requiring them to click on
ads or wait until the ads disappear in Period U. It is worth mentioning that the implicit condition
2

2

based on 𝑡 > 1−2𝜃 (or 𝑡 < 1−2𝜃 ) is 𝑡 > 1, meaning users are highly sensitive to app price.
𝑢

𝑢

The underlying implication is: When users are insensitive to app price, then regardless of what
size of the market, TP offering results in greater total welfare than TF offering. This finding
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offers another insight to policy makers.

5. Numerical Examples
In this section, I conduct numerical analysis. I compare TFA and TP strategies. In a
mobile app market for a typical app, I simply set 𝑎 = 5, 𝑐 = $10, 𝛽 = 2, 𝛾 = 2, 𝛿 = 0.8,
𝑠 = $2, 𝑣 = $2, respectively. I examine how market size (𝑁) and users’ disutility sensitivity to
app price (𝑡) impact the dominance of “switching from free to paid” and “keeping the app free
with ads” in this value setting. Fig. 2 depicts the dynamics of the strategy dominance. As
illustrated, when market size (𝑁) is large while users’ disutility sensitivity to app price (𝑡) is low
(lower than 1), TP strategy (“trial and then paid”) is dominant. Whereas when market size (𝑁)
is large while users’ disutility sensitivity to app price (𝑡) is high (greater than 1), TFA strategy
(“trial and then free with ads”) is dominant. Note that in this value setting, when market size (𝑁)
is small while users’ disutility sensitivity to app price (𝑡) is high (greater than 1), both TP and
TFA strategies are infeasible. The analysis result in this numerical example is consistent with
Proposition 3.
Fig. 2. Dominance: TPA versus TP Strategy. This figure illustrates how market size (𝑁) and
users’ disutility sensitivity to app price (𝑡) influence the dominance relationship in terms of the
optimal total profits between TFA and TP strategies. I set 𝑎 = 5, 𝑐 = $10, 𝛽 = 2, 𝛾 = 2,
𝛿 = 0.8, 𝑠 = $2, 𝑣 = $2, respectively.

6. Concluding Remarks
Mobile applications (apps) are a type of information goods that are evaluated by users’
perception and experience. In general, a user’s perception of an app impacts her decision on
downloading it; whereas her experience in using it will influence her willingness to engage with
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the app later on. In addition, consumers most likely choose to download the app appearing on
top ranking list due to the small screen size of mobile devices and the huge number of mobile
apps available. In this paper, I examine app developers’ product offering strategies by focusing
on the decision issue of whether to charge users after a trial period. I develop a two-period model
which considers several characteristics of the app market: app users’ willingness-to-download
and willingness-to-play, different users’ disutility sensitivities to ads and app price, app quality,
per-click ad revenue, time discount factor, and app ranking effort. The major contribution of the
current research is that it enriches the literature on mobile app offering strategies. In particular,
I extended Yu et al.’s (2017a, b) research by considering app ranking effort, app price, and ad
frequency of in-app advertisements that can impact a developer’s choice of revenue models.
Since the model developed in this research can be applied to the setting of whether a producer
should charge users directly or offer users free with ads after a trial period, the model and
analytical results can address similar decision problems that are prevalent in information goods
industry (e.g., online content products). Under information asymmetry condition, there are
several insights based on the analyses that have managerial implications.
First of all, regardless of what type of revenue models a developer has chosen, it is
possible to figure out the optimal app quality, app ranking effort and ad frequency/app price.
Furthermore, in “trial and then free with ads” (TFA) strategy, the optimal ad frequency is
determined by both the optimal app quality and per-click ad revenue; while in “trial and then
paid” (TP) strategy, the optimal price is determined by both the optimal app quality and users’
disutility sensitivity to app price. In general, a developer should display more frequent ads or
price the app higher for a relatively high quality app; however, it should display less frequent
ads or price the app lower if per-click ad revenue or users’ disutility sensitivity to app price is
relatively high.
Second, I find that taking the strategy of “free without ads” after a trial period is always
suboptimal, and, the choice between “free with ads” and “paid” strategies after a trial period is
dependent on both users’ disutility sensitivity to app price and market size. Intuitively, if users
are less sensitive to app price, charging users should be a better choice. Yet, the result shows
that in this situation, if market size is large, then “free with ads” is even more profitable. Also
surprisingly, when users are highly sensitive to app price, charging users a price for the app
could be a better choice if market size is small. The finding supplements Yu et al.’s (2017a)
conclusion regarding developers’ revenue model choice by offering another insight that market
size can be another determinant in their choice.
Finally, I also find that total welfare realized in either “free” or “paid” offering can be
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higher conditional on users’ willingness to play and market size. Specifically, for a market with
a small (large) base of high-type (low-type) users (i.e., high/low willingness-to-play users), free
app offering with embedded ads can result in higher total welfare than not displaying ads to
users. Further, when users are highly sensitive to app price, charging users directly can result in
higher total welfare than offering users the app for free with ads conditional on market size;
however, if users are insensitive to app price, offering the app free with ads always result in
higher total welfare than charging users directly. The findings suggest that Mendelson’s (2011)
viewpoint that “with information goods, the welfare-efficient price of any product, regardless
of its quality, is zero” might hold only under certain conditions. These findings also offer
insights to policy makers. For instance, a mobile app platform company (e.g., Apple Inc.) should
set an incentive scheme suitable for revenue model choices for different app developers who
face different market segments. As such, the ecosystem of its platform can be sustainable.
There are several limitations that might inspire future research on this topic from
different directions. First, due to the complexity of the current model, most of the analytical
results I derived are based upon the assumption that users’ willingness to play are unknown to
a developer when the app is launched (i.e., “information asymmetry” assumption). Although
“information asymmetry” is what we observe in most cases in reality, analyses based on an
“information symmetry” assumption may also be considered as an extension of this research.
To do that, I believe the current model structure has to be largely adjusted or even be totally
different. Second, in the current study I focus on a developer’s choice of fee-or-free after
offering users a trial period. In the mobile app industry, there are several other revenue models
that a developer can also consider, such as: paid, freemium (free for basic version and then paid
for additional features), paymium (paid for basic version and then paid for additional features),
and subscription. Further analysis of such revenue models can be explored. One must be aware
that for the above revenue models, the scenarios of product versioning and/or repetitive
purchases would make the analyses more complicated. In the present research, I assume that a
developer displays ads to all users with the same frequency. However, another future direction
of the study would be interesting, which is to investigate the developer’s problem while
considering “customized” ad frequencies for different users.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Proof for Proposition 1
The objective function (total profit) for TFA strategy is demonstrated in system (6),
which is: (𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 ) + 𝛿(𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) (1 −

𝑓𝑠
)𝑓𝑠)
𝑞

. This function is

strictly concave under information asymmetry assumption in decision variables of app quality
(𝑞), ranking effort (ℎ), and ad frequency (𝑓). Under the information asymmetry condition, the
developer makes decisions on app quality (𝑞) and ranking effort (ℎ) in Period T; and then
decides ad frequency (𝑓) in Period U. Therefore, I adopt two-step method to solve system (6).
Specifically, in step 1 I solve the model w.r.t. 𝑞 and ℎ by setting FOCs equal to zero. I
therefore obtain optimal solution 𝑞 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

and ℎ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
)
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

step 2, I substitute (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗) = (

function, and then solve the model w.r.t. 𝑓. I then get 𝑓 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

In

back into the objective

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑠

By now, I have identified the optimal decisions of app quality, ranking effort and ad
frequency for the developer who adopts TFA strategy, which is: ( 𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) =
(

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
,
).
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
221⁄4 𝛽3⁄8 𝑠

Appendix B. Proof for Proposition 2
The objective function (total profit) for TP strategy is presented in system (7), which is:
(𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) 𝑣 − 𝛾ℎ2 − 𝛽𝑞 2 ) + 𝛿(𝑁 (1 −

𝑎𝑐
ℎ𝑞

) (1 −

𝑡𝑝
)𝑝).
𝑞

This function is strictly concave

under information asymmetry assumption in decision variables of app quality (𝑞), ranking effort
(ℎ), and app price (𝑝). Under the information asymmetry condition, the developer makes
decisions on app quality (𝑞) and ranking effort (ℎ) in Period T; and then decides app price (𝑝)
in Period U. Therefore, I adopt two-step method to solve system (7). Specifically, in step 1 I
solve the model w.r.t. 𝑞 and ℎ by setting FOCs equal to zero. I therefore obtain optimal
solution 𝑞 ∗ =
=(

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

and ℎ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁 1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
)
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

model w.r.t. 𝑝. I then get 𝑝∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

In step 2, I substitute (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗)

back into the objective function, and then solve the

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
.
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑡
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By now, I have identified the optimal decisions of app quality, ranking effort and app
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

price for the developer who adopts TP strategy, which is: (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗, 𝑝∗ ) = (
𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
).
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑡

Appendix C. Proof for Proposition 3
To identify the global optimal strategy among TF, TFA and TP strategies, I compare the
optimal total profit for the three strategies. As I have discussed in Model section, TF strategy is
a special case of either TFA or TP, hence TF strategy is always suboptimal. In fact, it is noticed
that, under the information asymmetry assumption, the developer only decides app quality (𝑞)
and ranking effort (ℎ) in Period T. Since the three strategies have the same profit function for
Period T as seen in system (6), (7), and (8), the optimal solution for 𝑞
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
).
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8

i.e., (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗) = (

and ℎ are the same,

Because TF strategy does not have

profit function for Period U while the other two strategies have, TF strategy is always dominated
by TFA and TP strategies.
Therefore, I only need to compare TFA and TP strategies. As I have derived, the optimal
total profits for the two strategies are (see Table 2):
𝜋 𝑇𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁𝑣 −
𝜋 𝑇𝑃 = 𝑁𝑣 −

𝑎 3⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 𝛿
223⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

+

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁5⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝛿
421⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

221⁄4 𝑎 3⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾3⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 𝛿
8𝑡𝛽1⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

Hence, 𝜋 𝑇𝑃 − 𝜋 𝑇𝐹𝐴 =

+

− 2√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁√𝑣 and

23⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁5⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝛿
8𝑡𝛽 3⁄8

− 2√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁√𝑣.

(𝑡−1)(221⁄4 𝑎 3⁄4 𝛽 1⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 −23⁄4 𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁5⁄4 √𝑣)𝛿
.
8𝛽 3⁄8 𝑡𝑣 1⁄4

Thus, (1)

if 𝑡 − 1 > 0 , 221⁄4 𝑎3⁄4 𝛽1⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 − 23⁄4 𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 5⁄4 √𝑣 > 0 (i.e., 𝑁 <
2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

) must hold to make 𝜋 𝑇𝑃 > 𝜋 𝑇𝐹𝐴 ; (2) if 𝑡 − 1 < 0, 221⁄4 𝑎3⁄4 𝛽1⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 −

23⁄4 𝑎1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁 5⁄4 √𝑣 < 0 (i.e., 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

) must hold to make 𝜋 𝑇𝑃 > 𝜋 𝑇𝐹𝐴;

By now, I can conclude that under information asymmetry assumption, “trial and then
paid” (TP) strategy is dominant if users’ sensitivity to app price 𝑡 > 1 (𝑡 < 1) as well as market
size 𝑁 <

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

(𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

); otherwise, “trial and then free with ads” (TFA) strategy is

dominant; also, TF strategy is always suboptimal.
Appendix D. Proof for Proposition 4
In our research setting, a developer makes decisions on app quality and ranking effort
during the trial period; it then decides whether to embed ads by allowing users to play the app
for free. In this setting, by setting the same (𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ ), the welfares gained by users and the
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developer are equivalent between TFA and TF strategies in Period T. So I only compare welfares
in Period U between the two strategies.
For TFA strategy, the total welfare realized in Period U includes two components: net
utility gained by users and profit gained by the developer. To calculate total net utilities gained
by users in Period U, I substitute (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗, 𝑓 ∗) into the following function:
𝑁
2

𝑎𝑐

∗ (1 − ℎ𝑞)(1 −

𝑓𝑠
)(𝜃𝑢
𝑞

∗ 𝑞 − 𝑓 ∗ 𝑠), where

𝑁
2

𝑎𝑐

∗ (1 − ℎ𝑞)(1 −

𝑓𝑠
)
𝑞

represents the total number

of users captured in Period U and 𝜃𝑢 ∗ 𝑞 − 𝑓 ∗ 𝑠 represents the net utility gained by each user.
Next, I substitute (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗, 𝑓 ∗) into the developer’s profit function for Period U (i.e., Eq. (4)) in
order to calculate the profit gained by the developer in Period U. By adding up the two
components, I get the total welfare realized in Period U for TFA strategy as below: 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 =
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 (√2√𝑁√𝑣−2√𝑎𝛽1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 )(1+2𝜃𝑢 )
.
823⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

For TF strategy, the developer gains zero profit in Period U since it does not display ads.
On the other hand, all users who have installed the app will engage with the app since there is
no cost in doing this. Hence the total welfare function realized in Period U for TF strategy is:
𝑊𝑇𝐹 =

𝑁
2

𝑎𝑐

∗ (1 − ℎ𝑞) ∗ 𝜃𝑢 ∗ 𝑞 . By substituting ( 𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ ) into this function I get: 𝑊𝑇𝐹 =

(23⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁5⁄4 √𝑣−221⁄4 𝑎3⁄4 𝛽 1⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 )𝜃𝑢
.
4𝛽 3⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4
𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 (√2√𝑁√𝑣−2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 )(1−2𝜃𝑢 )
823⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

Thus, 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 − 𝑊𝑇𝐹 =
1

1

𝜃𝑢 < 2 (𝜃𝑢 > 2) and 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

(𝑁 <

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

. Therefore, if

), 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 > 𝑊𝑇𝐹 . We can thus conclude that

if users’ information of willingness-to-play (𝜃𝑢 ) is unknown to a developer before launching an
1

1

app, then when 𝜃𝑢 < 2 (𝜃𝑢 > 2) and market size 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

(𝑁 <

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝑔
𝑣

), TFA strategy

results in more total welfare than TF strategy.
Appendix F. Proof for Proposition 5
In our research setting, a developer makes decisions on app quality and ranking effort
during the trial period; it then decides whether to either keep free with ads (TFA) or charge users
directly (TP). In this setting, by setting the same (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗), the welfares gained by users and the
developer are equivalent between TFA and TP strategies in Period T. Hence, to compare the
total welfares realized in TFA and TP strategies, we only need to compare the welfares in Period
U.
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Similar to the proof in Proposition 4, we can calculate the optimal total welfares for the
TFA and TP strategies respectively as below:
𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 =
𝑊𝑇𝑃 =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 (√2√𝑁√𝑣−2√𝑎𝛽1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾1⁄4 )(1+2𝜃𝑢 )
,
823⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

and

(23⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁5⁄4 √𝑣−221⁄4 𝑎3⁄4 𝛽 1⁄4 𝑐 3⁄4 𝛾3⁄8 𝑁 3⁄4 )𝜃𝑢
.
4𝛽 3⁄8 𝑣 1⁄4

𝑊𝑇𝑃 − 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁3⁄4 (√2√𝑁√𝑣−2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾1⁄4 )(2−𝑡+2𝑡𝜃𝑢 )
.
823⁄4 𝛽3⁄8 𝑡𝑣 1⁄4
2
),
1−2𝜃𝑢

Therefore, (1) if 2 − 𝑡 + 2𝑡𝜃𝑢 > 0 (or 𝑡 >
(or 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾

then 𝑁 <

𝑣

then √2√𝑁√𝑣 − 2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 > 0

) must hold to have 𝑊𝑇𝑃 > 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 ; (2) if 2 − 𝑡 + 2𝑡𝜃𝑢 < 0 (or 𝑡 <

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾
𝑣

Thus,

2
),
1−2𝜃𝑢

must hold to have 𝑊𝑇𝑃 > 𝑊𝑇𝐹𝐴 .

By now, we can conclude that, under information asymmetry condition, when users’
2

disutility sensitivity to app price 𝑡 > 1−2𝜃

𝑢

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾
𝑣

2

(𝑡 < 1−2𝜃 ) and market size 𝑁 >

2𝑎𝑐√𝛽𝛾

𝑢

𝑣

(𝑁 <

), TP strategy results in higher total welfare than TFA strategy.

Appendix G. Proof for Lemma 1
In TFA strategy, there are two periods in the planning timespan: trial period (Period T) and usage
period (Period U). Under information asymmetry assumption, as listed in Table 2, the optimal
solution to the model for TFA strategy is ( 𝑞 ∗ , ℎ∗ , 𝑓 ∗ ) = (
𝑎 1⁄4 𝛽 1⁄8 𝑐 1⁄4 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4 𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
).
21⁄4 𝛾 3⁄8
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑠
𝑎𝑐

𝑎𝑐

𝑁(1 − ℎ𝑞) and 𝐷𝑢 = 𝑁(1 − ℎ𝑞)(1 −
and 𝐷𝑢 we have 𝐷𝑑 = 𝑁 −

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

,

The realized demands in Periods T and U are 𝐷𝑑 =

𝑓𝑠
),
𝑞

respectively. By substituting (𝑞 ∗, ℎ∗, 𝑓 ∗) into 𝐷𝑑

√2√𝑎𝛽 1⁄4 √𝑐𝛾 1⁄4 √𝑁
√𝑣

and 𝐷𝑢 =

𝑁
2

−

⁄
⁄
𝐷
√𝑎𝛽 1 4 √𝑐𝛾 1 4 √𝑁
. Hence, 𝐷𝑢
2
𝑣
√ √
𝑑

1

= 2.

Thus, we can conclude that, for a developer adopting TFA strategy under information
asymmetry condition, to achieve maximal total profit, it should only focus on half of the users
captured in the trial period.
Appendix H. Proof for Lemma 2
In the model for TFA strategy (i.e., system (6)), as we have obtained under the
information asymmetry assumption (see Table 2), the optimal ad frequency and app quality are
𝑓∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑠

and 𝑞 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾 1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8
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, respectively. Hence,

𝑓∗
𝑞∗

=

1
2𝑠

(or

𝑓∗ =

𝑞∗
).
2𝑠

It is therefore concluded that, if users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown

to a developer before launching an app, there is a relation among the optimal ad frequency, the
𝑞∗

optimal app quality and per-click ad revenue, which is 𝑓 ∗ = 2𝑠.
Appendix I. Proof for Lemma 3
Similar to the proof for Lemma 2, in the model for TP strategy (i.e., system (7)), the
optimal app price and app quality are 𝑝∗ =
respectively (see Table 2). Hence,

𝑝∗
𝑞∗

=

1
2𝑡

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
221⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8 𝑡

(or 𝑝∗ =

𝑞∗
).
2𝑡

and 𝑞 ∗ =

𝑎 1⁄4 𝑐 1⁄4 𝛾1⁄8 𝑁1⁄4 𝑣 1⁄4
,
21⁄4 𝛽 3⁄8

We can therefore conclude that, if

users’ information of willingness-to-play is unknown to a developer before launching an app,
there is a relation among the optimal app price, the optimal app quality and users’ disutility
𝑞∗

sensitivity to app price, which is 𝑝∗ = 2𝑡.
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